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20 juni

 
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2006 6:56    Onderwerp: 20 juni Reageer met quote

une 20

1919 German cabinet resigns over Versailles deadlock

On this day in 1919, during the final days of the Versailles Peace Conference held in Paris, France, the German cabinet deadlocks over whether to accept the peace terms presented to its delegation by the other nations at the peace conference—most notably the Council of Four: France, Britain, the United States and Italy—and ratify the Versailles Treaty.

Presented with the terms of the treaty on May 7, 1919, the German delegation was given two weeks to examine the document and submit their official comments in writing. The Germans, who had put great faith in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s notion of a so-called “peace without victory” and had pointed to his famous Fourteen Points as the basis upon which they sought peace in November 1918, were greatly angered and disillusioned by the treaty. By its terms, Germany was to lose 13 percent of its territory and 10 percent of its population; it would also have to pay reparations, a punishment justified in the treaty by the infamous Article 231, which placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany.

Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Germany’s foreign minister and leader of the German delegation at Versailles, was furious about the treaty. “This fat volume was quite unnecessary. They could have expressed the whole thing more simply in one clause—Germany renounces its existence.” The country’s military leaders were similarly against the treaty; as Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg saw it, “as a soldier I can only prefer honorable defeat to a disgraceful peace.” Some members of the coalition government that had taken power in Berlin, however, were of a different view, believing that Germany, in its weakened state, would benefit by signing the treaty in order to put the war behind it and begin rebuilding its manufacturing and commerce operations.

After Brockdorff-Rantzau’s delegation passed a unanimous recommendation to reject the treaty, the German cabinet, which had previously been leaning towards signing, deadlocked in its vote on June 20 and subsequently resigned en masse. Brockdorff-Rantzau followed suit, leaving Paris, and politics, altogether. Friedrich Ebert, the German president since late 1918, was persuaded to stay on, however, and as the Allied deadline of June 23 approached, he managed to assemble another cabinet to put the issue to a vote. After a last-minute flurry of activity, the German National Assembly voted to sign the treaty and its answer was delivered to the Council of Four at 5:40 p.m. on June 23. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, five years to the day after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo.
www.historychannel.com
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 0:41    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

The Bismarck During the War

The "Bismarck" was the most unfortunate of the three ships. Whereas the "Imperator" had at least seen a couple of years of actual service and was then idle in friendly waters and the "Vaterland" after only a few crossings had been trapped in a neutral, later hostile, harbor, the largest of the trio was not even completed when war broke out. Her launching on June 20, 1914 was one of the most celebrated maritime events of the time, but only eight days later the gunshots at Sarajevo killed the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, leading to war within a month.

Throughout the war, the "Bismarck" sat at her builders' yard, "a rusting shell of what was intended to be the world's largest ship and the flagship of the German merchant fleet." There were rumors that the liner was to be completed and would be used to carry the entire Imperial family on an around-the-world victory cruise. The "Bismarck" again stood for dozens of new liners that were awaiting completion in German shipyards when war broke out, among them the new "Columbus" (later White Star's "Homeric") and "Hindenburg" of the North-German Llloyd, both almost 40,000 tons large.

http://www.ocean-liners.com/ships/bismarck.asp
Zie ook http://www.search.com/reference/RMS_Majestic
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 18:16    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Battle of Lemberg, 20-22 June 1915

The battle of Lemberg, 20-22 June 1915, was a short-lived Russian attempt to defend the great fortress of Lemberg against advancing German and Austrian troops during the aftermath of the great German victory at Gorlice-Tarnow. That battle had seen the Germans break through the Russian lines at the western end of the Carpathian front and advance east along the line of the mountains, forcing the Russians to abandon their attempt to invade Hungary.

Lemberg was a great Austro-Hungarian fortress at the eastern end of that front. It had been captured by the Russians during the battles of Lemberg of 1914, which had seen the Austrians first forced back to the Carpathians. In June 1915 it was defended by two tired Russian corps (VIII and XVIII) under General Brusilov. His army had been fighting in the Carpathians since the winter and was significantly under strength.

On 20 June the German XLI Reserve corps and Austrian VI corps launched an attack on Lemberg. These were relatively fresh units – the Germans in particular had been at close to full strength at the start of the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive and the Russians in Lemberg were outnumbered.

The battle was short-lived. On 22 June the Germans and Austrians broke into the outskirts of Lemberg, and to avoid being trapped Brusilov pulled his corps out of the city. The Russian retreat would continue until mid-September, and their new front line would be fifty miles east of Lemberg.

Rickard, J (30 August 2007), Battle of Lemberg, 20-22 June 1915, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_lemberg1915.html
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 18:19    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 June 1916 - WW1 Blog - Jersey Heritage: Jobs for women as States defer Military Service debate

After opening the debate at the start of June on introducing compulsory military service, the States were expected to resume discussions at a sitting this week. It seems, however, that the Defence Committee, which has been charged with drawing up the new law, is not yet ready. As a result, the States will now sit in early July to consider proposals.

In the meantime, it’s clear that Jersey’s labour market is already changing in response to the wartime departure of men. The situation was underlined this week by the opening in St Helier of a new Female Labour Employment Bureau. The bureau’s mission is matching women who are willing and able to work with organisations that have lost men to military service. Potential employees and employers can register with the bureau, which charges a small fee to cover its running costs.

Any women finding work through the bureau will not be the first to take on men’s roles in Jersey however. The recent appointment of female ‘postmen’ has attracted widespread attention. The first, Miss Lillian Smith, started delivering letters in the Georgetown and Havre des Pas area last week.

https://www.jerseyheritage.org/ww1-blog/20-june-1916
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005


Laatst aangepast door Percy Toplis op 20 Jun 2018 10:31, in totaal 1 keer bewerkt
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 18:21    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Sunday 20th June 1915- Diary of HV Reynolds

‘Things have been very quiet today. A church service was held in our camp this evening. A couple of shells fell right in the track at Dawkins Point at 8.30pm, usually there are numbers passing the spot about that time but fortunately no one was near it tonight. A heavy infantry action seems to be in progress down south tonight. An outburst of rifle fire occurred at about 11pm on our right flank.’

http://www.awm.gov.au/blog/2010/06/20/sunday-20th-june-1915-diary-of-hv-reynolds/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 18:22    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

HMS Havelock (1915)

HMS Havelock was an Abercrombie-class monitor of the Royal Navy that saw service in the First World War.

On 3 November 1914, Charles M. Schwab of Bethlehem Steel offered Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, the use of four 14in/45cal BL MK II twin gun turrets, originally destined for the Greek ship Salamis. These turrets could not be delivered to the German builders, due to the British Naval blockade. The Royal Navy immediately designed a class of monitors, designed for shore bombardment, to use the turrets.

HMS Havelock was laid down at the Harland and Wolff Ltd shipyard at Belfast on 12 December 1914. The ship was named General Grant in honour of the US General Ulysses S Grant, however as the United States was still neutral, the ship was hurriedly renamed HMS M2 on 31 May 1915. She was then named HMS Havelock on 20 June 1915.

HMS Havelock sailed for the Dardanelles in June 1915. She remained in the Eastern Mediterranean until returning to England in January 1916. She then served as a guard ship at Lowestoft. She was decommissioned in May 1919, and disarmed in June 1920. Sold for breaking up in May 1921, she was retained in reserve until resold on 25 June 1927 to the Ward shipyard at Preston for breaking up.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Havelock_(1915)
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 18:25    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

SOLDIER AND DRAMATIST
BEING THE LETTERS OF HAROLD CHAPIN, AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO DIED FOR ENGLAND AT LOOS ON SEPTEMBER 26TH, 1915.


To his Wife.

June 20th, 1915.

MY DARLING

We are still here; in the mining town. It improves on acquaintance; many decent cafés and the usual small farms where omelettes, café au lait, pommes-frits and other luxuries can be obtained. I am living beyond my pay having developed a great distaste for army food since my spell of illness. I still have a little reserve though, and probably another spell at the A.D.S soon will give me a chance to economise.

Mayer's dainties and the asparagus were most successful. By the way, never send me anything in the form of Bovril or Oxo. Our fellows are loaded up with it and we don't want it---we get too much meat as it is. Oh! for vegetables!

Say: you may be reached by idle rumours that the 2nd London Div. may or will come home sooner or later. Don't take any notice. These rumours get about without perceptible foundation and are only unsettling. It is most unlikely that we shall get further back than a base for a little rest and moreover it is more than likely that if the Div. moves back we---the 6th---will be attached to some other brigade and the 4th and 5th look after the Div. in its retirement. No other Territorial Field Amb. stands as high with the Powers as we do, and we are at full strength and in no great need of a rest yet.

Bless you.

http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/chapin/Chapin05.htm#108
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:17    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Robert Lansing on Military Operations in Mexico, 20 June 1916

From March-June 1916 the United States mounted an armed expedition to Mexico to quell raids initiated by prominent Mexican leader Pancho Villa into the U.S.

Allegedly sponsored by the German government Villa launched a raid into the State of Chihuahua on 11 January 1916, capturing and killing 19 U.S. citizens. This was followed on 9 March with a raid upon Columbus in New Mexico, killing 11 citizens.

Following U.S. protests Mexico's President Venustiano Carranza undertook to deal with Villa but insisted that the U.S. not interfere. However with the U.S. rapidly losing patience with Carranza, General Frederick Funston - U.S. commander along the border - was ordered to despatch an armed U.S. column into Mexico in pursuit of Villa (to be taken dead or alive). To that end Funston placed General John Pershing in command of the expedition.

Pershing led 4,000 U.S. troops into Mexico on 15 March 1916, remaining there until early 1917. On 29 March 1916 a U.S. force of 400 men defeated a larger number of Villa's followers. Nevertheless U.S. troops remained to mop up the remnants of Villa's supporters; these troops increasingly came into contact - and armed conflict - with official Mexican troops sent by President Carranza to deal with Villa, the first of which took place on 12 April 1916.

Increasing clashes led to a very real threat of war between the U.S. and Mexico; on 18 June 1916 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson called out the National Guard to deal with the Mexican problem. As these were gathering along the Mexican border President Carranza backed down, releasing a group of captured U.S. troops and despatching a note of apology on 4 July 1916, in which he suggested convening a conference to prevent future issues.

Reproduced below is U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing's reply to a May 1916 formal letter of complaint from Mexican President Carranza.


U.S. Government's Reply to President Carranza's Letter of Complaint
Washington, June 20, 1916.


Sir:

I have read your communication, which was delivered to me on May 22, 1916, under instructions of the Chief Executive of the de facto Government of Mexico, on the subject of the presence of American troops in Mexican territory, and I would be wanting in candour if I did not, before making answer to the allegations of fact and the conclusions reached by your Government, express the surprise and regret which have been caused this Government by the discourteous tone and temper of this last communication of the de facto Government of Mexico.

The Government of the United States has viewed with deep concern and increasing disappointment the progress of the revolution in Mexico.

Continuous bloodshed and disorders have marked its progress. For three years the Mexican Republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have been permitted to roam at will through the territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States, who ventured to remain in Mexican territory or to return there to protect their interests, have been taken, in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to justice.

It would be difficult to find in the annals of the history of Mexico conditions more deplorable than those which have existed there during these recent years of civil war.

It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed.

During the past nine months in particular, the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens, sometimes carrying American citizens across the international boundary with the spammer seized.

American garrisons have been attacked at night, American soldiers killed, and their equipment and horses stolen. American ranches have been raided, property stolen and destroyed, and American trains wrecked and plundered.

The attacks on Brownsville, Red House Ferry, Progreso Post Office, and Las Peladas, all occurring during September last, are typical. In these attacks on American territory, Carranzista adherents and even Carranzista soldiers took part in the looting, burning, and killing.

Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but uncivilized acts of mutilation were perpetrated. Representations were made to General Carranza, and he was emphatically requested to stop these reprehensible acts in a section which he has long claimed to be under the complete domination of his authority.

Notwithstanding these representations and the promise of General Nafarrete to prevent attacks along the international boundary, in the following month of October a passenger train was wrecked by bandits and several persons killed seven miles north of Brownsville, and an attack was made upon United States troops at the same place several days later.

Since these attacks, leaders of the bandits well known both to Mexican civil and military authorities, as well as to American officers, have been enjoying with impunity the liberty of the towns of Northern Mexico.

So far has the indifference of the de facto Government to these atrocities gone that some of these leaders, as I am advised, have received not only the protection of that Government, but encouragement and aid as well.

Depredations upon American persons and property within Mexican jurisdiction have been still more numerous.

This Government has repeatedly requested in the strongest terms that the de facto Government safeguard the lives and homes of American citizens and furnish the protection which international obligation imposes, to American interests in the northern States of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora, and also in the States to the south.

For example, on January 3rd, troops were requested to punish the bands of outlaws which looted the Cusi mining property, eighty miles west of Chihuahua, but no effective results came from this request.

During the following week the bandit, Villa, with his band of about 200 men, was operating without opposition between Rubio and Santa Ysabel, a fact well known to Carranzista authorities. Meanwhile a party of unfortunate Americans started by train from Chihuahua to visit the Cusi mines, after having received assurances from the Carranzista authorities in the State of Chihuahua that the country was safe and that a guard on the train was not necessary.

The Americans held passports or safe conducts issued by authorities of the de facto Government. On January 10th the train was stopped by Villa bandits, and eighteen of the American party were stripped of their clothing and shot in cold blood, in what is now known as the "Santa Ysabel massacre."

General Carranza stated to the agent of the Department of State that he had issued orders for the immediate pursuit, capture, and punishment of those responsible for this atrocious crime, and appealed to this Government and to the American people to consider the difficulties of according protection along the railroad where the massacre occurred.

Assurances were also given by Mr. Arredondo, presumably under instructions from the de facto Government, that the murderers would be brought to justice, and that steps would also be taken to remedy the lawless conditions existing in the State of Durango.

It is true that Villa, Castro, and Lopez were publicly declared to be outlaws and subject to apprehension and execution, but so far as known only a single man personally connected with this massacre has been brought to justice by Mexican authorities.

Within a month after this barbarous slaughter of inoffensive Americans, it was notorious that Villa was operating within twenty miles of Cusihuiriachic and publicly stated that his purpose was to destroy American lives and property.

Despite repeated and insistent demands that military protection should be furnished to Americans, Villa openly carried on his operations, constantly approaching closer and closer to the border.

He was not intercepted nor were his movements impeded by troops of the de facto Government and no effectual attempt was made to frustrate his hostile designs against Americans. In fact, as I am informed, while Villa and his band were slowly moving toward the American frontier in the neighbourhood of Columbus, N.M., not a single Mexican soldier was seen in this vicinity.

Yet the Mexican authorities were fully cognizant of his movements, for on March 6, as General Gavira publicly announced, he advised the American military authorities of the outlaw's approach to the border, so that they might be prepared to prevent him from crossing the boundary.

Villa's unhindered activities culminated in the unprovoked and cold-blooded attack upon American soldiers and citizens in the town of Columbus on the night of March 9th, the details of which do not need repetition here in order to refresh your memory with the heinousness of the crime.

After murdering, burning, and plundering, Villa and his bandits, fleeing south, passed within sight of the Carranzista military post at Casas Grandes, and no effort was made to stop him by the officers and garrison of the de facto Government stationed there.

In the face of these depredations, not only on American lives and property on Mexican soil, but on American soldiers, citizens, and homes on American territory, the perpetrators of which General Carranza was unable or possibly considered it inadvisable to apprehend and punish, the United States had no recourse other than to employ force to disperse the bands of Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness systematically raiding across the international boundary.

The marauders engaged in the attack on Columbus were driven back across the border by American cavalry, and subsequently, as soon as a sufficient force to cope with the band could be collected, were pursued into Mexico in an effort to capture or destroy them.

Without cooperation or assistance in the field on the part of the de facto Government, despite repeated requests by the United States, and without apparent recognition on its part of the desirability of putting an end to these systematic raids, or of punishing the chief perpetrators of the crimes committed, because they menaced the good relations of the two countries, American forces pursued the lawless bands as far as Parral, where the pursuit was halted by the hostility of Mexicans, presumed to be loyal to the de facto Government, who arrayed themselves on the side of outlawry and became in effect the protectors of Villa and his band.

In this manner and for these reasons have the American forces entered Mexican territory.

Knowing fully the circumstances set forth, the de facto Government cannot be blind to the necessity which compelled this Government to act, and yet it has seen fit to recite groundless sentiments of hostility toward the expedition and to impute to this Government ulterior motives for the continued presence of American troops on Mexican soil.

It is charged that these troops crossed the frontier without first obtaining the consent or permission of the de facto Government. Obviously, as immediate action alone could avail, there was no opportunity to reach an agreement (other than that of March 10th-13th, now repudiated by General Carranza) prior to the entrance of such an expedition into Mexico if the expedition was to be effective. Subsequent events and correspondence have demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Government that General Carranza would not have entered into any agreement providing for an effective plan for the capture and destruction of the Villa bands.

While the American troops were moving rapidly southward in pursuit of the raiders, it was the form and nature of the agreement that occupied the attention of General Carranza, rather than the practical object which it was to obtain-the number of limitations that could be imposed upon the American forces to impede their progress, rather than the obstacles that could be raised to prevent the escape of the outlaws.

It was General Carranza who suspended through your note of April 12th all discussions and negotiations for an agreement along the lines of the protocols between the United States and Mexico concluded during the period 1882-1896, under which the two countries had so successfully restored peace on their common boundary.

It may be mentioned here that, notwithstanding the statement in your note that "the American Government gave no answer to the note of April 12th," this note was replied to on April 14th, when the department instructed Mr. Rodgers by telegraph to deliver this Government's answer to General Carranza.

Shortly after this reply the conferences between Generals Scott, Funston, and Obregon began at El Paso, during which they signed on May 2nd a project of a memorandum ad referendum, regarding the withdrawal of American troops.

As an indication of the alleged bad faith of the American Government, you state that though General Scott declared in this memorandum that the destruction and dispersion of the Villa band "had been accomplished," yet American forces are not withdrawn from Mexico.

It is only necessary to read the memorandum, which is in the English language, to ascertain that this is clearly a misstatement, for the memorandum states that "the American punitive expeditionary forces have destroyed or dispersed many of the lawless elements and bandits ... or have driven them far into the interior of the Republic of Mexico," and, further, that the United States forces were then "carrying on a vigorous pursuit of such small numbers of bandits or lawless elements as may have escaped."

The context of your note gives the impression that the object of the expedition being admittedly accomplished, the United States had agreed in the memorandum to begin the withdrawal of its troops.

The memorandum shows, however, that it was not alone on account of partial dispersion of the bandits that it was decided to begin the withdrawal of American forces, but equally on account of the assurances of the Mexican Government that their forces were "at the present time being augmented and strengthened to such an extent that they will be able to prevent any disorders occurring in Mexico that would in any way endanger American territory," and that they would "continue to diligently pursue, capture, or destroy any lawless bands of bandits that may still exist or hereafter exist in the northern part of Mexico," and that it would "make a proper distribution of such of its forces as may be necessary to prevent the possibility of invasion of American territory from Mexico."

It was because of these assurances and because of General Scott's confidence that they would be carried out that he said that American forces would be "gradually withdrawn."

It is to be noted that, while the American Government was willing to ratify this agreement, General Carranza refused to do so, as General Obregon stated, because, among other things, it imposed improper conditions upon Mexico.

Notwithstanding the assurances in the memorandum, it is well known that the forces of the de facto Government have not carried on a vigorous pursuit of the remaining bandits, and that no proper distribution of forces to prevent the invasion of American territory has been made.

I am reluctant to be forced to the conclusion which might be drawn from these circumstances that the de facto Government, in spite of the crimes committed and the sinister designs of Villa and his followers, did not and does not now intend or desire that these outlaws should be captured, destroyed, or dispersed by American troops or, at the request of this Government, by Mexican troops.

Source Records of the Great War, Vol. IV, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/mexico_lansing.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:19    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Dick's Diary - The 1916 war diaries of 2nd Lieut. Richard T C Willis Fleming

20 June 1916 - General Parker and his staff came up this morning and inspected our positions. He told us we lost three aeroplanes on our raid to El Arish on Sunday, but they think they smashed up one Fokker which was on the ground outside its hangar. They saw ten hangars there altogether.
Bathed this afternoon - a rough sea. Buxton from the Essex Battery came up this evening to see our positions here and stay a day or two. Topping mail in this evening. Up in the O.Pip tonight.

http://www.willisfleming.org.uk/dicksdiary/entries/1916/06/tuesday-20-june-1916.html
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005


Laatst aangepast door Percy Toplis op 20 Jun 2018 10:32, in totaal 1 keer bewerkt
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:20    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Nova Scotia general election, 1916

The 1916 Nova Scotia election was held on 20 June 1916 to elect members of the 36th House of Assembly of the Province of Nova Scotia, Canada. It was won by the Liberal party.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nova_Scotia_general_election,_1916
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:24    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Leslie Crompton Blackman: His death in World War 1

Leslie Crompton Blackman's life with the 5th Battalion

30 March 1916 The Battalion arrived at Marseilles aboard HMT Briton.

31 March 1916 At 06.00 the Battalion disembarked.

04 April 1916 Initial training was begun at the Steentje base.

17 April 1916 Bayonet, musketry, gas drill and route marches training continued at Fort Rompu.

30 April 1916 Battalion moved to the quiet forward trenches of Fleurbaix, to gain experience.

13 May 1916 The 5th were relieved by 7th Battalion.

31 May 1916 Back to the lines for ten days of digging and sniping.

9/10 June 1916 Moved back to billets in various Belgium villages.

20 June 1916 'Orders were received that the Battalion was to proceed to Neuve Eglise, and over the Belgium border they marched to this place, where they were accommodated in small canvas bivouacs. Here the following three weeks were spent training and the inevitable fatigues. From here they shifted to the famous Ploegsteert Wood, a forest belonging to the King of Belgium (sic) and which became world famous under the name Plugstreet. Comfortable huts, sheltered by the hill, housed them here, and the inevitable fatigues recommenced. The fatigue parties were introduced to gas cylinders which they carried up to the front line. A heavy awkward burden for two men, they were laboriously transported and placed under the firing step in readiness for the attack, which took place a few days later, after the usual heavy bombardment. Only some few of the Fifth, who had been picked for raiding parties, were in the front line at this time.'

http://web.onetel.com/~rgcrompton/crompton/1821info13.html
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:28    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 June 1917 - 186025 Cpl Harold Albert Bolton MM, 8th Bn CEF.

Born at Darlingford, Manitoba on 25 April 1896, Harold was educated at Calf Mountain and Darlingford Public Schools before gaining employment in 1912 with the Darlingford branch of the Bank of British North America. He enlisted (into the 90th Bn) on 6 November 1915 and proceeded to the UK in continuation of his training. After being attached to the 8th Bn CEF, Harold went to France in early 1916.

For gallantry in action during the Arras offensive in April 1917, Harold was awarded the Military Medal (Gazette date 18 July 1917) but was killed in action by shellfire in the vicinity of Acheville-Arleux (not too far from where his younger brother was to fall two months later) before receiving it. He is now buried in Ecoivres Military Cemetery.

http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-people/remember-on-this-day/1324-20-june-1917-cpl-harold-albert-bolton-mm.html
Zie ook http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem/detail&casualty=64834
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:31    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Somerset Maugham

On June 20, 1917, a British Secret Agent - though better recognized as the outstanding writer, Somerset Maugham - was assigned on a mission in Russia. The mission: to prevent the socialist revolution.

On the personal order of Sir William Wiseman, Head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, Maugham’s goal was to keep the Provisional Government* in power and encourage Russia’s further participation in WWI, primarily by cracking down on the German pacifist propaganda.

According to declassified data from August to November of 1917, Maugham appeared to be practically the top resident agent in Russia. With an allowance of 21,000 English pounds, an immense sum of money at the time, Maugham was planted in Russia as an American journalist, his true purpose kept secret even from the British Ambassador to Russia.

One of Maugham’s objectives was to secure the support of multiple Czech political organizations, based in Russia and having close ties to British Intelligence. Their total number was estimated at 70 thousand members. The Czech garrisons were stationed in Russia on alert, if need be, to lend military support to counter-revolutionary activity.

Maugham was also expected to set up a wide intelligence and propaganda network in Russia, to encourage unrest and extend Russia’s consumptive mission in WWI. The network was comprised of groups of professionals trained to deliver speeches at workers’ meetings in plants and factories, and to work up disturbances and unsanctioned protests in the military and industrial sectors.

Maugham placed emphasis on the importance of the visual media to better influence the target audiences, but he admitted their futility when created by British or American specialists, suggesting that Russian writers be attracted to write texts. The total cost of these propaganda activities was worth an estimated $500,000 a year.

On October 18, 1917, Maugham was summoned by Aleksandr Kerensky, the Prime Minister in the Provisional Government, with a request to appeal to London for additional help, namely extra armaments, food supplies, and the supportive tone of the English press. Kerensky’s Provisional Government was already suffocating from the looming Bolsheviks. However, by the time he got to the office of Britain’s Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Maugham learnt that Bolsheviks had already taken over the power. Ergo, his mission had failed.

The job was probably always impossible, but Maugham subsequently claimed that, had he been able to get there six months earlier, he might have succeeded.

*Provisional Government - the short-lived administrative body governing Russia immediately after the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II in February 1917. It lasted approximately eight months, and was dissolved after power in Russia was seized by the Bolsheviks during the October Socialist Revolution of 1917.

http://rt.com/Russia_Now.html
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:33    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

V. I. Lenin - Is There a Way to a Just Peace?
First published in Pravda No. 75, June 20, 1917

Is there a way to peace without an exchange of annexations, without the division of spoils among the capitalist robbers?

There is: through a workers’ revolution against the capitalists of the world.

Russia today is nearer to the beginning of such a revolution than any other country.

Only in Russia can power pass to existing institutions, to the Soviets, immediately, peacefully, without an uprising, for the capitalists cannot resist the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies.

With such a transfer of power it would be possible to curb the capitalists, now making thousands of millions in profits from contracts, to expose all their tricks, arrest the millionaire embezzlers of public property, break their unlimited power.

Only after the transfer of power to the oppressed classes could Russia approach the oppressed classes of other countries, not with empty words, not with mere appeals, but calling their attention to her example, and immediately and explicitly proposing clear-cut terms for universal peace.

“Comrade workers and toilers of the world,” she would say in the proposal for an immediate peace. “Enough of the bloodshed. Peace is possible. A just peace means peace without annexations, without seizures. Let the German capitalist robbers and their crowned robber Wilhelm know that we shall not come to terms with them, that we regard as robbery on their part not only what they have grabbed since the war, but also Alsace and Lorraine, and the Danish and Polish areas of Prussia.

“We also consider that Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, and other non-Great-Russian lands were seized by the Russian tsars and capitalists.

“We consider that all colonies, Ireland, and so on, were seized by the British, French and other capitalists.

“We Russian workers and peasants shall not hold any of the non-Great-Russian lands or colonies (such as Turkestan, Mongolia, or Persia) by force. Down with war for the division of colonies, for the division of annexed (seized) lands, for the division of capitalist spoils!”

The example of the Russian workers will be followed inevitably, perhaps not tomorrow (revolutions are not made to order), but inevitably all the same by the workers and all the working people of at least two great countries, Germany and France.

For both are perishing, the first of hunger, the second of depopulation. Both will conclude peace on our terms, which are just, in defiance of their capitalist governments.

The road to peace lies before us.

Should the capitalists of England, Japan and America try to resist this peace, the oppressed classes of Russia and other countries will not shrink from a revolutionary war against the capitalists. In this war they will defeat the capitalists of the whole world, not just those of the three countries lying far from Russia and taken up with their own rivalries.

The road to a just peace lies before us. Let us not be afraid to take it.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/jun/20.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:36    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Cape Town docks, Cape Town, South Africa, 19-20 June 1917

“Docks at Cape Town. S.S. Tyndareus in front.” Exterior view showing two ships in dock. The Tyndareus (1915-1960) had struck a mine on 6 February 1917, on her maiden voyage, and was repaired at Simonstown Naval base at Cape Town.
The image is from an album chronicling the war time experiences of Archibald Clive Irvine (1893-1974) in East Africa. During this time he would meet Dr John W Arthur which in turn would lead to his missionary work at Chogoria in Kenya.

Fotootje... http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll123/id/81467
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005


Laatst aangepast door Percy Toplis op 20 Jun 2018 8:34, in totaal 1 keer bewerkt
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:43    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Punch, or the London Charivari, Volume 152, June 20, 1917

A North of England man, obviously wishing to appear unusual, still persists in the stupid story that he did not hear the Messines explosion.

A man who purchased sandwiches at a railway restaurant and afterwards threw them into the road was fined five shillings at Grimsby Police Court last week. His explanation—that he did not know they might injure the road—was not accepted by the Court.

The Kaiser, it appears, has lost no time in commiserating with his troops on their magnificent victory at Messines.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17629/17629-h/17629-h.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 19:51    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

The War in the Mountains

Notes on Kipling's visit to the Italian battle-front in 1917, during the Great War and the articles he wrote


THE TRENTINO FRONT
[June 20 1917]

IT DOES NOT NEED an expert to distinguish the notes of the several Italian fronts. One picks them up a long way behind the lines, from the troops in rest or the traffic on the road. Even behind Browning's lovely Asolo where, you will remember, Pippa passed, seventy-six years since, announcing that 'All's right with the world,' one felt the tightening in the air.

The officer, too, explained frankly above his map:

'See where our frontier west of the Dolomites dips south in this V-like spearhead. That's the Trentino. Garibaldi's volunteers were in full possession of it in our War of Independence. Prussia was our ally then against Austria, but Prussia made peace when it suited her - I'm talking of 1864 - and we had to accept the frontier that she and Austria laid down. The Italian frontier is a bad one everywhere - Prussia and Austria took care of that - but the Trentino section is specially bad.'

Mist wrapped the plateau we were climbing. The mountains had changed into rounded, almost barrel- shaped heights, steep above dry valleys. The roads were many and new, but the lorries held their pace; the usual old man and young boy were there to see to that. Scotch moors, red uplands, scarred with trenches and punched with shell-holes, a confusion of hills without colour and, in the mist, almost without shape, rose and dropped behind us. (1) They hid the troops in their folds - always awaiting troops - and the trenches multiplied themselves high and low on their sides.

We descended a mountain smashed into rubbish from head to heel, but still preserving the outline, like wrinkles on a forehead, of trenches that had followed its contours. A narrow, shallow ditch (it might have been a water-main) ran vertically up the hill, cutting the faded trenches at right angles.

'That was where our men stood before the Austrians were driven back in their last push - the Asiago push, don't you call it? (2) It took the Austrians ten days to work half-way down from the top of the mountain. Our men drove that trench straight up the hill, as you see. Then they climbed, and the Austrians broke. It's not as bad as it looks, because, in this sort of work, if the enemy uphill misses his footing, he rolls down among your men, but if you stumble, you only slip back among your friends.'

'What did it cost you?' I whispered.

'A good deal. And on that mountain across the gorge - but the mist won't let you see it - our men fought for a week - mostly without water. The Austrians were the first people to lay out a line of twelve-inch shell-holes on a mountain's side to serve as trenches. It's almost a regulation trick on all the fronts now, but it's annoying.'

He told tales of the long, bitter fight when the Austrians thought, till General Cadorna showed them otherwise, they had the plains to the south at their mercy. I should not care to be an Austrian with the Boche behind me and the exercitus Romanus in front.

It was the quietest of fronts and the least ostentatious of armies. It lived in great towns among forests where we found snow again in dirty, hollow-flanked drifts, that were giving up all the rubbish and refuse that winter had hidden. Labour battalions dealt with the stuff, and there were no smells. Other gangs mended shell- holes with speed; the lorries do not like being checked.

Another township, founded among stones, stood empty except for the cooks and a bored road-mender or two. The population was up the hill digging and blasting; or in wooded park-like hollows of lowland. Battalions slipped like shadows through the mists between the pines. When we reached the edge of everything, there was, as usual, nothing whatever, except uptorn breadths of grass and an 'unhealthy' house - the battered core of what had once been human - with rain-water dripping through the starred ceilings. The view from it included the sight of the Austrian trenches on pale slopes and the noise of Austrian guns - not lazy ones this time, but eager, querulous, almost questioning.

There was no reply from our side. 'If they want to find out anything, they can come and look,' said the officer.

One speculated how much the men behind those guns would have given for a seat in the car through the next few hours that took us along yet another veiled line of arms. But perhaps by now the Austrians have learned.

The mist thickened around us, and the far shoulders of mountains, and the suddenly-seen masses of men who loomed out of it and were gone. We headed upwards till the mists met the clouds, by a steeper road than any we had used before. It ended in a rock gallery (3) where immense guns , set to a certain point when a certain hour should come, waited in the dark.

'Mind how you walk! It's rather a sharp turn there.'

The gallery came out on a naked space, and a vertical drop of hundreds of feet of striated rock tufted with heath in bloom. At the wall-foot the actual mountain, hardly less steep, began, and, far below that again, flared outward till it became more reasonable slopes, descending in shoulders and knolls to the immense and ancient plains four thousand feet below.

The mists obscured the northern views, but to the southward one traced the courses of broad rivers, the thin shadows of aqueducts, and the piled outlines of city after city whose single past was worth more than the future of all the barbarians clamouring behind the ranges that were pointed out to us through the observatory windows. The officer finished his tales of year-long battles and bombardments among them.

'And that nick in the skyline to the right of that smooth crest under the clouds (4) is a mine we sprung,' said he.

The observation shutter behind its fringe of heather-bells closed softly. They do everything without noise in this hard and silent land.

The New Italy

Setting aside the incredible labour of every phase of the Italian war, it is this hardness that impresses one at every turn - from the stripped austerity of General Cadorna's headquarters, which might be a monastery or a laboratory, down to the wayside muleteer, white with dust, but not a bead of sweat on him, working the ladder-like mountain trails behind his animal, or the single sentry lying-out like a panther pressed against a hump of rock, and still as the stone except for his shadowed eyes. There is no pomp, parade, or gallery play anywhere, nor even, as far as can be seen, a desire to turn the best side of things to the light. 'Here,' everybody seems to imply, 'is the work we do. Here are the men and the mechanisms we use. Draw your own conclusions.' No one is hurried or over-pressed, and the 'excitable Latin' of the Boche legend does not appear. One finds, instead, a balanced and elastic system, served by passionate devotion, which saves and spares in the smallest details as wisely and with as broad a view as it drenches the necessary position with the blood of twenty thousand men.

Yet it is not inhuman nor oppressive, nor does it claim to be holy. It works as the Italian, or the knife, works - smoothly and quietly, up to the hilt, maybe. The natural temperateness and open-air existence of the people, their strict training in economy, and their readiness to stake life lightly on personal issues have evolved this system or, maybe, their secular instinct for administration had been reborn under the sword.

When one considers the whole massed scheme of their work one leans to the first opinion; when one looks at the faces of their generals, chiselled out by war to the very cameos of their ancestors under the Roman eagles, one inclines to the second.

Italy, too, has a larger number than most countries of men returned from money-getting in the western republics, who have settled down at home again. (They are called Americanos. They have used the new world, but love the old.) Theirs is a curiously spread influence which, working upon the national quickness of mind and art, makes, I should imagine, for invention and faculty. Add to this the consciousness of the New Italy created by its own immense efforts and necessities - a thing as impossible as dawn to express in words or to miss in the air - and one begins to understand what sort of future is opening for this oldest and youngest among the nations. With thrift, valour, temperance, and an idea, one goes far.

They are fighting now, as all civilisation fights, against the essential devildom of the Boche, which they know better than we do in England, because they were once his ally.

To that end they give, not wasting or sparing, the whole of their endevour. But they are under no illusions as to guarantees of safety necessary after the War, without which their own existence cannot be secured. They fight for these also, because, like the French, they are logical and face facts to the end.

Their difficulties, general and particular, are many. But Italy accepts these burdens and others in just the same spirit as she accepts the cave-riddled plateaux, the mountains, the unstable snows and rocks and the inconceivable toil that they impose upon her arms. They are hard, but she is harder'.

Yet, what man can set out to judge anything? In an hotel waiting for a midnight train, an officer was speaking of some of d'Annunzio's poetry that has literally helped to move mountains in this war. He explained an allusion in it by a quotation from Dante. An old porter, waiting for our luggage, dozed crumpled up in a chair by the veranda. As he caught the long swing of the verse, his eyes opened! His chin came out of his shirt-front, till he sat like a little hawk on a perch, attentive to each line, his foot softly following its cadence.


©Rudyard Kipling 1917

Notes
1. A good description of the ascent from the Brenta valley near Marostica up to the Asiago plateau where, later in the year, British troops were in action. There are a number of British War Cemeteries in the area.
2. On 14 May 1916 the Austrian III and IV Armies attacked on a wide front in the Trentino, capturing Arsiero and Asiago. The Italians counter-attacked in July and recovered about half the territory lost.
3. Probably on Monte Cengio or the nearby Forte Punta Corbin. There are spectacular views of the Venetian Plain and the valley of the Astico.
4. This would have been Monte Cimone, near Tonezza, mined in September 1916.


http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_mountains_trentino.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 20:08    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 June 1918 → Commons Sitting → ALLIED WAR AIMS.

BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.


HC Deb 20 June 1918 vol 107 cc483-4 483

Mr. OUTHWAITE asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the public support for this country's declaration of war on Germany was secured on behalf of the Belgian people, he can state whether the Belgian Government has been associated with the territorial aims of the Allies as set out in what are known as the secret treaties?

Mr. BALFOUR I see no connection between the two clauses of the hon. Member's question. The Belgian Government are not parties to the treaties to which he refers.

Mr. OUTHWAITE Is it not a fact that the territorial aims of the secret treaties are opposed to the interests of Belgium, as making for the prolongation of the War, and are not the interests of Belgium being disregarded?

Mr. BALFOUR I dissent from the view of the hon. Gentleman; but we cannot discuss it by question and answer.

Mr. OUTHWAITE Why is the Belgian Government not consulted in these matters, as we went to war on behalf of Belgium?

Mr. OUTHWAITE asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that this country declared war on Germany on behalf of the Belgian people, he will invite the Belgian Government to express its opinion as to whether the interests of Belgium can be best served by a policy of negotiation for peace, or by one that seeks to secure redress by the prolongation of the War until a victorious military decision has been achieved by the Allies?

Mr. BALFOUR Our Belgian Allies are always at liberty to express their opinion on matters of common interest.

Mr. OUTHWAITE Have the views of the Belgian Government been sought in this matter of the question of entering into negotiations or the prolongation of the War for military victory?

Mr. BALFOUR We are in constant communication with the Belgian Government. Whether we begin a conversation with them or they begin a conversation with us is quite immaterial. They are perfectly at liberty to discuss any question of common interest with us. Perhaps that will satisfy even the hon. Gentleman.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1918/jun/20/belgian-government
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 23:12    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Diary of My Trip Abroad 1915-19

538 Cpl. Ivor Alexander Williams, 21st Battalion, Australia Imperial Forces

June 16th 1917. Oh! The joyful news. I was today informed that I was to proceed to Blighty ( England ) for 6 months on the staff.

June 17th 1917. 5 am. Walked about 2 miles to Bapaume where I got a lift on a motor transport convoy to Albert, about 19 kilos. When passing through the remains of Le Sars. A Taube dropped a bomb on the convoy, killing and completely destroying two motor lorries. 2 pm. caught the train for Bolougne arriving about 6 pm. and walked up one of the steepest hills to St. Martin's Wireless Camp. I can tell you it was hot too.

June 18th 1917. We are still waiting here. Had a terrible storm all day.

June 19th 1917. Caught boat to Folkestone and then train to London.

June 20th 1917. Wandered at large round London and went to the Opera "Louise" in the evening.

http://www.nashos.org.au/17diary.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 23:22    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Report copied from The Peterborough Standard, dated June 20th 1916.

DEATH OF PTE. CRANE, OF CASTOR.
We much regret to record the death of Pte. D. Crane, 6th Northants Regiment, of Castor. Pte. Crane was seriously wounded in the back while on active service in France on Jan 28th. He was taken to the casualty clearing station, where he remained nine days. He was then moved to the base hospital at Rouen, but he was too seriously injured ( he had a fractured spine) to recover, and he died peacefully on Feb 16th. He was laid to rest with full military honours on Feb 17th, in St. Ewen’s cemetery, Rouen, where many more of our brave English boys who have given their life for King and country repose. The Rev. Dr. Richards, chaplain to the 11th Stationary Hospital, Rouen, officiated. Mrs Crane cannot speak too highly of the care and attention bestowed upon her husband by the nurses and their kindness in writing to her full particulars of his state. They speak highly of his patience and courage, and gratitude, and cheerfulness. In a letter to Mrs Crane, the Chaplain also speaks of Pte. Crane’s great courage and fortitude, and the Commissioner of Graves has promised to send a photograph of the grave to Mrs Crane. Deceased was a great favourite with his comrades at the Front, who speak highly of his good qualities. He is the first of the Castor contingent to lose his life in the war. One of his comrades who was fighting by his side says that when wounded Crane, although in terrible agony, would not even groan and let them know how badly he was wounded, until the fighting was over. Canon Hulbert most sympathetically alluded to him in his sermon on Sunday evening, when Mrs Crane and her children were at the service. The sympathy of every one goes out to the widow and her three children in their sad bereavement. Pte. Crane was a most affectionate father, writing home almost daily. He was also very much liked and esteemed by his master (Mr Gordon Smith) and his fellow workmen.

Also reported: Pte. A. D. Crane died of wounds at Rouen. The family have left Castor since the father enlisted.

http://www.thearchive.org.uk/military/war_memorial/pte_daniel_crane.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2010 23:30    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

HANSARD → 20 June 1917 → Commons Sitting → ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

PRISONERS IN UNFORTIFIED TOWNS.

Colonel WEIGALL asked the Prime Minister whether the Government will consider the advisability of placing Ger man prisoners of war in the unfortified towns in the Isle of Thanet in view of the fact that British prisoners are now in Karlsruhe and Freiburg?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Bonar Law) The Government are not prepared to adopt the course suggested by the hon. Member.

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1917/jun/20/prisoners-in-unfortified-towns
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BerichtGeplaatst: 23 Jun 2011 22:27    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

1916
Eastern Front

Germans penetrate Russian lines at Smorgon (Vilna), but are driven out; Russians cross Sereth (south of Czernowitz).

Southern Front

Slight Italian advance on Asiago plateau.

Asiatic and Egyptian Theatres

Capture of Mecca, Jeddah and most of Taif, and siege of Medina, by Sherif of Mecca, reported.

Naval and Overseas Operations

General Smuts' despatch on operations in German East Africa published.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1916_06_20.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2017 11:03    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Mail Tribune 100, June 20, 1917

BANKS REFUSE TO PAY INTEREST ON CITY DEPOSITS

The members of the city council were considerably peeved at their meeting last night when a communication from the Medford banks was read in which the banks stated that they accepted the recent order of the council to furnish surety company bonds to protect city deposits, but that hereafter they would pay no interest on city deposits.

The temper of the councilmen as shown in remarks last night is such that unless the Medford banks continue to pay interest on city deposits, the council will place city funds in banks that will pay interest. Mayor Gates said: “Everytime we ask something of the banks they take away something from the city. They first reduced the rate of interest and now they refuse to pay any interest.”

The charter of the city stipulates that the council must require surety bonds of the banks.

The entire matter was placed in the hands of the council finance committee with the suggestion that a mutual agreement of some kind might be made with the banks which would lead to a continuation of paying interest.

The council members will spend Friday at the city water works intake to decide on the best means to provided the city with adequate and healthful water supply with the limited finances which at present can be devoted to this matter.

The consensus of opinion of the councilmen is that while the present intake must be removed to another location as soon as possible, the present flimsy intake structure may be repaired at expense of several hundred dollars to last for several months or until such time as the council has funds on hand which will permit the removal of the intake to another location.

Although plans were informally discussed to obtain the city’s water supply from an entirely new source than the Fish Lake dam, it was generally admitted that such talk was useless at the present time because it will be several years at least before the city can spend from $125,000 to $200,000 on a new source of supply.

http://www.mailtribune.com/news/20170620/mail-tribune-100-june-20-1917
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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In oorlogstijd. Het volledige dagboek van de Eerste Wereldoorlog – Stijn Streuvels

20 juni 1917
In Kortrijk worden 7.000 werkelozen opgeëist, en ditmaal zijn het niet alleen werkelozen maar mensen van de begoede burgerij en zelfs rijken. Over heel de streek verwacht men hetzelfde en samengebracht met de laatste gebeurtenissen en het bedrijvig leggen van nieuwe ijzerwegen, besluiten de mensen een mogelijke achteruittocht van de Duitsers of een doorbraak van de Engelsen. De paniek komt er in en te Vichte vind ik mensen die hun goeds aan 't inpakken zijn en zich gereed maken om te vluchten.
Vandaag werden al de paspo[o]rten ingevraagd en we worden, zegt men, ingelijfd bij het operatiegebied en alle weerbare mannen zullen weggebracht worden, - 't begin van het einde... maar de angst is algemeen.

http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/stre009inoo02_01/stre009inoo02_01_0034.php
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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J BATTERY, 2ND CAVALRY DIVISION, 20TH JUNE 1918

Object description - Stock film of a Royal Horse Artillery 13-pounder battery manoeuvring at high speed, rear areas of the Western Front, 20 June 1918.

Full description - The battery canters into a field and unlimbers, deploying its guns, then relimbers and canters off. The battery canters in column head-on out of the field and turns away when close to the camera. One limber comes back in the opposite direction. (Note the 'linked horseshoe' divisional badge on the limbers.) Limbered-up guns canter over a bump facing away from the camera - one gun overturns in the process and another is already lying wrecked nearby. The battery including outriders canters through and along a deep stream, throwing up a lot of spray.

Filmpje... https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060022735
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005


Laatst aangepast door Percy Toplis op 20 Jun 2018 8:28, in totaal 1 keer bewerkt
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Buitenland - Een telegram uit Stockholm

Een telegram uit Stockolm meldt, volgens het Hbl., dat het Nederlandsch-Skandinavisch comité het volgende telegram heeft ontvangen:

Tijdens dezen oorlog heeft Turksch Armenië de vreeselijkste martelingen ondergaan. De vreedzame bevolking, bestaande uit niet minder dan 800,000 zielen, werd weggevoerd, kinderen werden op bevel van de Turksche regeering vermoord. Duitschland bleef dit alles als een onverschillig toeschouwer aanzien.

Na de verschrikkingen, die op de afgrijselijkheden van Abdoel Hamid gevolgd zijn, kan de wereld-democratie Armenië niet langer onder de macht van Turkije laten. Ik hoop, dat alle afdeelingen van de Internationale, bij het proclameren van een vrede zonder annexatie het Armeensche volk niet zullen vergeten, maar vrijheid voor Armenië zullen opeischen, omdat zonder die vrijheid geen duurzame vrede in het Oosten mogelijk is. Het Telegram was geteekend door Micael Jounisson Varandian, afgevaardigde voor Armenië bij het Internationaal Socialistisch Bureau.

Het Centrum
, 20 juni 1917
Bron: Koninklijke Bibliotheek

http://www.armeensegenocide.info/pers_nl.html
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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Postcard from Henry Carter Rogers to Alma Smith Rogers, 20 June 1918

Postcard from Henry Carter Rogers to Alma Smith Rogers (Mrs. H. M. Rogers). Postcard details military and camp life during World War I and materials to send him through the mail. Image depicts where Henry Carter was living and working: Fort Sheridan, Lake County, Illinois. Writing on front reads, "'Over the Bridge' Fort Sheridan, Ill." "Post Exchange" and "Y.M.C.A." Handwriting on front reads, "near my quarters."

Bekijk de kaart op http://replica.palni.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15705coll24/id/566
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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The Old and the Bold - Lieutenant-General The Hon. J. C. Smuts - First East African Despatch - London Gazette #29630 - Tuesday, 20th June, 1916

War Office, 20th June, 1916.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General The Hon. J. C. Smuts, Commander-in-Chief, East African Force:-

General Headquarters, East Africa, 30th April, 1916.

MY LORD,-

In accordance with your instructions, I assumed command of His Majesty’s Forces in East Africa on the 12th February, and sailed from South Africa on that day.

I arrived at Mombasa on the 19th of February, and was met there by Major-General Tighe, who explained to me fully the situation in East Africa and the steps he had taken to push forward all preparations for an operation in the Kilimanjaro area before the rains. I decided to visit immediately the two proposed lines of advance by Mbuyuni and Longido, and to make a personal reconnaissance in company with General Tighe.

As a result of this reconnaissance I cabled your Lordship on arrival at my General Headquarters in Nairobi on 23rd February that I was prepared to carry out the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area before the rainy season, and received your sanction on 25th February.

2. It will, I think, assist a clear understanding of this despatch if I here briefly recapitulate the outstanding features of the military situation in East Africa, and also the steps recently taken by General Tighe towards the development of the advance into German territory which was made possible by the arrival of the reinforcements from South Africa.

At the commencement of 1916 the German forces in German East Africa were estimated at some 16,000 men, of whom 2,000 were white, with 60 guns and 80 machine guns. They were organised in companies varying from 150 to 200 strong, with 10 per cent of whites and an average of two machine guns per company.

The enemy occupied a considerable tract of British territory. At Taveta they had established a large entrenched camp, with an advanced position at Salaita (El Oldorobo), an entrenched camp at Serengeti, and an outpost at Mbuyuni, the latter places thirteen and seventeen miles respectively east of T'aveta. At Kasigau they maintained a garrison of 500-600 rifles with the object of delaying our concentration by blowing up the Uganda railway and the Voi-Maktau railway. Their numerous attempts to accomplish this end were uniformly futile. In the coastal area they maintained a considerable garrison on the Umba River, and actively patrolled thence to the vicinity of the Uganda railway, Mwele Mdogo and Gazi. At numerous points throughout the 600 miles of land frontier the opposing troops were in touch, and the result was that General Tighe had to disseminate widely his small force, and was unable to keep any large reserve in hand to meet a sudden call. In spite of the fact that he had to be constantly on the watch for the next move of his active and enterprising foe, General Tighe kept steadily before him the necessity of doing all in his power to prepare the way for the eventual offensive movement. With this end in view he organised such of his infantry as could be spared for active operations into the 1st and 2nd East African Brigades, acting on the Taveta and Longido lines respectively, and proceeded to develop the organisation of the whole force into two divisions and line of communication troops.

3. On the 15th January the 1st Division, under Major-General Stewart, was ordered to occupy Longido and to develop the lines of communication between that place and Kajiado, on the Magadi railway. On the 22nd January the 2nd Division, under Brigadier-General Malleson, advanced from Maktau to Mbuyuni, meeting with slight opposition, and on the 24th occupied Serengeti camp. This advance had the immediate effect of making the enemy evacuate Kasigau. The railway was advanced from Maktau to Njoro drift, three miles east of Salaita, and arrangements made for the concentration of a large force at and near Mbuyuni. The greatest difficulty in the way of this concentration was the lack of water, the Serengeti plains being by nature a waterless desert. A 2½-inch pipe was laid from Bura, but this did not suffice, over 100,000 gallons being required daily, and the pipe yielding only 40,000. The balance had to be made good by railway and storage tanks. The whole of the watering arrangements were so carefully worked out that not a single hitch occurred when the main concentration eventually took place, in spite of the fact that an enemy raiding party succeeded in damaging the Bura head works. For this great credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Collins, R.E., who was General Tighe’s C.R.E.

I cannot speak too highly of all the preliminary work done by General Tighe in the direction of organisation and preparation for offensive measures. This left me free on arrival to devote my whole energies to active operations, and I take this opportunity of placing on record my appreciation of the fact that the success of those operations is in a large measure due to General Tighe’s foresight and energy in paving the way for the expected reinforcements.

4. Early in February the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade arrived, and on the 12th of that month General Tighe directed the 2nd Division to make a reconnaissance in force of Salaita, and if possible to occupy that position. General Malleson carried out this operation with three battalions 2nd South African Brigade and three battalions 1st East African Brigade, supported by 18 guns and howitzers. The Salaita position is one of considerable natural strength, and had been carefully entrenched. The enemy was found to be in force and counter-attacked vigorously. General Malleson was compelled to withdraw to Serengeti, but much useful information had been gained, and the South African Infantry had learned some invaluable lessons in bush fighting, and also had opportunity to estimate the fighting qualities of their enemy.

5. This brings the operations up to the date on which I arrived in East Africa, and decided, as mentioned above, that the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area before the rainy season was a feasible operation.

The original plan devised by General Tighe had been to occupy the Kilimanjaro area by making a converging advance from Longido and Mbuyuni with the 1st and 2nd Divisions respectively, with Kahe as the point towards which movement was to be directed. To this main plan I adhered, but I decided that some alteration of dispositions was necessary in order to avoid frontal attacks against entrenched positions of the enemy in the dense bush and to secure the rapidity of advance which appeared to me essential to the success of the operation in the short time at our disposal before the commencement of the rains, which might be expected towards the end of March.

Accordingly I issued orders that the 1st South African Mounted Brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Van Deventer should be transferred from the 1st Division to Mbuyuni and act from there directly under my orders in a turning movement to the north of Taveta and Salaita. This transfer was carried out by rail most expeditiously, and by March 4th all minor concentrations were complete, the 3rd S.A. Brigade had arrived in the country, and my force was disposed as follows:-

1st Division (less 1st South African Mounted Brigade), Longido.

2nd Division (less detachments), Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

1st South African Mounted Brigade, Mbuyuni.

Army Artillery, Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

The 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, one field and one howitzer battery, were retained by me as Force Reserve.

6. The general outline of my plan has been explained to your Lordship in various telegrams, but I will recapitulate the main points here.

The task of the 1st Division was to cross the 35 miles of waterless bush which lay between Longido and the Engare Nanjuki River, occupy the latter, and then advance between Meru and Kilimanjaro to Boma Jangombe. My intention was thereafter to direct this division on Kahe, and cut the enemy’s line of communication by the Usambara Railway.

The task of the 1st South African Mounted Brigade and of the 2nd Division was to advance through the gap between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Hills against the enemy’s main force, which was reported to be concentrated in the neighbourhood of Taveta, with strong detachments at the head of Lake Jipe, in the bush east of the river Lumi and at Salaita. The total force with which the enemy could oppose our advance into the Kilimanjaro area was estimated at 6,000 rifles, with 37 machine guns and 16 guns.

7. The manner in which I proposed to initiate the operation was as follows:-

(a) 1st Division to commence its forward movement on the 5th March and be allowed two clear days’ start before the advance against Taveta should begin.

(b) 1st South African Mounted Brigade and 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, both under command of General Van Deventer, to leave Mbuyuni and Serengeti on the evening of the 7th March, and make a night march to the river Lumi east of Lake Chala. On the 8th to seize the high ground round Lake Chala and develop a turning movement by the west against Taveta. The object of this turning movement was partly to surprise the enemy and partly to avoid a frontal attack through the thick bush which lay between Salaita and Taveta.

(c) 2nd Division to advance against Salaita Hill on the morning of the 8th March, entrench a line facing the hill, and make preparations for an attack, supported by the Army Artillery.

(d) Force Reserve to follow General Van Deventer’s column during the night of the 7th-8th March and take up a central position astride the Lumi, whence it could be used to reinforce either Van Deventer or the 2nd Division, as required.

It will be readily seen that these movements demanded the greatest energy and decision on the part of the commanders concerned. In order to be in close touch with the main operations round Taveta I decided to accompany the Force Reserve to the Lumi, leaving part of my General Staff at Mbuyuni to control operations elsewhere.

The initial movements were carried out successfully and with very slight opposition on the part of the enemy, who was undoubtedly taken by surprise. The 1st Division succeeded in crossing the waterless belt safely, and by the afternoon of the 6th March had its advanced troops established on the small hill Nagasseni just east of the river Engare Nanjuki. By 2 p.m. on the 7th the whole division was concentrated at this point, and on the 8th moved to Geraragua.

8. On the evening of the 7th March General Van Deventer’s column started on its march across the Serengeti plains for Chala. The 1st South African Mounted Brigade from Mbuyuni and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade from Serengeti Camp. The Force Reserve under General Beves followed in rear of the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade.

At 6 a.m. on the 8th March the 1st South African Mounted Brigade reached the Lumi River near the southern end of the Ziwani swamp, and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade simultaneously arrived on the river east of Lake Chala. General Van Deventer at once proceeded to make good the high ground lying between Lake Chala and Rombo Mission. He then made a converging movement on the Chala position from the east and north-west, sending the brigade scouts to threaten the enemy’s line of retreat to the south. Chala was only lightly held by the enemy, and these dispositions soon caused him to withdraw on Taveta. General Van Deventer occupied Chala and pursued towards Taveta, a portion of which position was occupied by the 2nd South African Horse. As, however, the enemy in Taveta were in considerable strength, General Van Deventer considered it wise to concentrate on the Chala position before dark.

Meanwhile the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the Force Reserve halted astride the Lumi to guard the crossing. During the afternoon an enemy force estimated at from 300 to 500, which had been cut off from the main body by our unexpected movement to Chala, advanced from the north along the line of the river in thick bush, and made more than one attack on the outposts of the infantry in bivouacs. These attacks were easily repulsed with loss to the enemy, but also caused most of the losses we sustained that day.

While the bulk of my forces were engaged in making good the Chala position and the Lumi crossing, the 2nd Division, under Major-General Tighe, carried out, on the 8th March, an artillery bombardment of Salaita, and the infantry of the 1st East African Brigade advanced and dug themselves in, in readiness for an attack on the 9th.

9. At dawn on the 9th General Van Deventer sent his mounted troops to get astride the Moschi road west of Taveta, which place the enemy evacuated in the course of the day. He also sent the 12th South African Infantry to make good Ndui Ya Warombo Hill and the Lumi bridge east of Taveta. The 2nd Division continued to bombard Salaita, and at 2 p.m. the infantry advanced to the attack, only to find that the bombardment, coupled with the turning movement via Chala, had compelled the enemy to evacuate, just in time to avoid two squadrons of the 4th South African Horse sent to intercept their retreat.

10. Early on the 10th a regiment of South African Horse despatched from Chala to make good Taveta were able to seize the position before a large body of the enemy, who had obviously been sent back to reoccupy it. After a brief fight the enemy withdrew towards the Latema-Reata nek, hotly pursued by mounted troops and field artillery. The enemy fought a stubborn rearguard action, and eventually was left in position on the nek.

On the same date the 2nd Division advanced to Taveta, detaching garrisons at Serengeti and Salaita. The Lumi crossing was found impassable for motor lorries and heavy guns, and the bulk of the transport did not cross until the bridge had been improved about mid-day on the 11th.

11. On the morning of the 11th General Van Deventer on the right advanced via Spitze Hill and Kile on Mamba Mission and the line of the Himo. In the centre the 4th South African Horse, supported by the 12th South African Infantry, made good East Kitowo Hill after a brisk skirmish. On the left the mounted troops of the 2nd Division reconnoitred the Latema-Reata nek, which was found to be held in some strength. The Force Reserve was ordered to move from Chala to Taveta.

It was now clear that the enemy had withdrawn from Taveta in two directions, along the Taveta-Moschi road towards the west and along the Taveta-Kahe road between Reata and Latema Hills towards the south-west, but the exact line of retirement of his main forces was uncertain. The 4th S.A. Horse were in touch with what appeared to be merely a rearguard on the Moschi road, and an enemy force of unknown strength was in position on the Latema-Reata nek. It was essential to determine whether this was only a covering force, or whether the enemy was in such strength as to threaten a counter-attack towards Taveta. In either case it was necessary to drive him from the nek before I could advance beyond Taveta.

The 2nd Division had in Taveta only three weak battalions of the 1st East African Brigade, eight 12 pr. guns and a howitzer battery. With these I determined to clear up the situation and, if possible, make good the nek.

12. This operation was entrusted to Brigadier-General Malleson, commanding the 1st East African Brigade, who had at his disposal

Belfield’s Scouts.

Mounted Infantry Company.

Nos. 6 and 8 Field Batteries.

No. 134 Howitzer Battery.

2nd Rhodesian Regiment.

130th Baluchis.

3rd King’s African Rifles.

Machine Gun Battery, Loyal North Lancs.

Volunteer Machine Gun Company.

General Malleson selected as his objective the spur of Latema, which commands the nek from the north, and at 11.45 a.m. advanced to the attack. The 130th Baluchis on the right and 3rd K.A.R. on the left formed the firing line, 2nd Rhodesian Regiment the general reserve. The mounted troops watched both flanks, and the artillery supported the attack at a range of about 3,500 yards.

As they approached the bush-clad slopes of Latema the firing line came under a heavy rifle and machine gun fire. The enemy also had at least two guns and several pom-poms in action, and our infantry could make little headway.

13. At 4 p.m. the Force Reserve began to arrive in Taveta, and I reinforced the 2nd Division with the 5th South African Battalion. At the same time General Malleson, who was seriously indisposed, asked to be relieved of his command, and I directed General Tighe to assume command of the operation personally.

On the arrival of the 5th South African Infantry, General Tighe ordered the Rhodesians to advance, and to carry the King’s African Rifles forward with them in an assault on the Latema ridge, the 130th Baluchis co-operating vigorously on the right. All ground gained was to be at once made good. The 9th Field Battery and 5th South African Field Battery, as they arrived in Taveta, were brought into action in support of the attack. This assault was gallantly pressed home, especially by the Rhodesians, but failed to make good the ridge. The 3rd K.A.R., who had been hotly engaged since the outset, had the misfortune to lose their gallant leader, Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Graham, and several other officers. General Tighe found it necessary to support the Baluchis with half the 5th South African Infantry, and I further reinforced the 2nd Division with the 7th South African Infantry.

14. This latter battalion reached General Tighe about 8 p.m., and shortly afterwards he decided that the best chance of quickly dislodging the enemy from their position on the nek was to send in the two South African Battalions with the bayonet by night. This operation was no doubt fraught with considerable risk as there was no opportunity of adequately reconnoitring the ground over which the attack must be made, nor was it by any means certain that the enemy was not present in large numbers. On the other hand the moon was in the first quarter, and so facilitated movement up to midnight; the bush along the line of the road to the nek did not appear to be very dense; and, moreover, the volume of fire developed by the enemy did not seem to indicate that he had a large force actually in his first line, though he had, as usual, a large proportion of machine guns in action.

15. The night advance of the two South African Battalions was ably organised and gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Byron, Commanding 5th South African Infantry. The 7th South African Infantry formed the 1st line, with the 5th in support. They advanced with great dash through the bush, which proved to be much thicker than was anticipated, driving the enemy before them till the latter was on the crest, where he checked our advance. A certain amount of disintegration was inevitable in a night advance through the dense thorn bush in the face of stubborn opposition. Groups of men and individuals who got separated from their leaders had no course but to fall back to the position where the 1st East African Brigade was formed up in general reserve, about 1,500 yards east of the nek. Colonel Byron had issued instructions that, on reaching the crest, Lieutenant-Colonel Freeth, commanding the 7th South African Infantry, and Major Thompson of the same battalion, should wheel outwards and make good the heights north and south of the nek respectively, while Colonel Byron himself secured the actual nek. These two gallant officers most ably carried out their task. Colonel Freeth fought his way up the steep spurs of Latema till he found that the party with him had dwindled to 18 men. He was joined by a few of the Rhodesians and King’s African Rifles, who had clung on to the crest of the ridge after the assault in the evening, and the small party held on till daylight. Major Thompson wheeled towards Reata with 170 men and dug himself in in an advantageous position. About midnight Colonel Byron reached the nek within 30 yards of the enemy’s main position. The opposition here was very stubborn. At one point Major Mainprise, R.E., Brigade Major, and 22 men were killed by the concentrated fire of three machine guns, and Colonel Byron, who was himself slightly wounded, reached the nek with only 20 men. The enemy was still in a position which commanded the ground he had won, and, finding it impossible either to advance or to hold his ground, he was reluctantly compelled to withdraw.

16. Meanwhile General Tighe found it extremely difficult to keep touch with the progress of the fight, of which he could only judge by the firing and the reports of officers and others sent back from the ridge, who naturally were only cognisant of events in their own immediate vicinity. About 1 a.m.

several requests for reinforcements reached him, and he ordered forward the 130th Baluchis. These advanced at 1.20 a.m., and shortly met Colonel Byron, who reported that he had ordered his small party to retire. General Tighe accordingly re-formed his force and dug in astride the road to await daylight. Attempts to gain touch with Colonel Freeth and Major Thompson failed.

Judging by General Tighe’s reports, I considered that it was inadvisable to press the direct attack on the Latema-Reata nek further, and preferred to await the effect of the turning movement of the mounted troops, which was ordered for the next morning, and calculated to cause a speedy withdrawal of the enemy from this position. I accordingly, at 4.30 a.m., directed General Tighe to withdraw his whole force before daybreak to a line further back from the nek. This withdrawal was in progress when patrols sent to gain touch with the flank detachments on Reata and Latema found the latter in occupation of both hills and the enemy in full retreat from the nek. I at once despatched the 8th South African Infantry to make good the ridge, and some artillery to shell the retiring enemy, who was now estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,000 in number. Effective pursuit through the dense tropical forest which stretched from Kitowo to Kahe was out of the question.

17. Our casualties in the engagement were about 270, which cannot be considered excessive in view of the important results gained. We captured, besides rifles and ammunition, a 6 cm. gun and three machine-guns. Some 40 to 50 enemy dead were found on the position, and, as they are always most careful to remove their dead and wounded, there can be no doubt that their casualties were severe. While this action was in progress on the Taveta-Kahe road, the 4th South African Horse and 12th South African Infantry kept up a brisk engagement with the enemy on the Taveta-Moschi road, where the enemy was found to be in strong force on the northern slopes of Latema and on North Kitovo Hill. At one point 20 of the enemy dead were found after the engagement.

18. With the end of this action the first phase of the battle for Kilimanjaro came to a conclusion. On the 12th March General Van Deventer continued his advance up to Mamba Mission and the Himo Bridge on the Taveta-Moschi road, in the face of slight opposition. The enemy in his retirement during the night and the early morning had destroyed all bridges on the road, and great difficulty was experienced in rationing Van Deventer’s force. On the 13th he advanced and occupied Moschi unopposed, the enemy having withdrawn the previous night towards Kahe. The 2nd and 3rd South African Brigades were thereupon concentrated at the Himo Bridge, the remainder of the 2nd Division at Taveta.

19. It is necessary now to refer to the movements of the 1st Division, which had arrived at Geraragua on the 8th, having encountered only slight opposition. On the 9th General Stewart halted to reconnoitre and let his supplies catch up. The direct road from Geraragua to Boma-Ja-Ngombe was reported impassable for wheels, all bridges having been destroyed by the enemy. As a result of this and of the exhausted state of his ox transport, General Stewart considered it necessary to halt on the morning of the 10th, and reconnoitre for a road further to the west. A difficult but passable track was found, and the march was resumed at mid-day. The mounted troops left Geraragua at 16 hours on the 10th, on which date they encountered some opposition, sustaining 13 casualties. The Division and the mounted troops eventually joined hands on the Sanja River on the night of the 12th/13th, and on the 13th advanced to Boma-Ja-Ngombe. On the 14th, when the main force of the enemy had already retired to the Ruwu and Kahe positions, the 1st Division joined hands with General Van Deventer in New Moschi, through which place the six companies of the enemy who had been opposing General Stewart had already passed on the night of the 12th March, as previously stated.

20. The next few days, from the 13th to the 18th March, were spent in improving the road from Taveta to Moschi, reorganising transport, bringing up supplies, etc., and in reconnoitring towards Kahe and the Ruwu River. The whole of the country bordering that river on the north is dense tropical forest, and the enemy took advantage of this to display some boldness in firing into our camps by night.

On the night of the 17th/18th Belfield’s Scouts were sent from Himo bridge to occupy Unterer Himo, and at dawn were driven off by a superior force of the enemy. A position on the Ruwu river appeared to me from patrols, intelligence reports and somewhat incomplete air reconnaissance, to be the next which the enemy might hold, and it was of vital importance for purposes of railway extension and future advance that the enemy should be driven south of this river before the rains commenced.

I therefore, on the 18th, issued orders for a general advance towards the Ruwu. On the extreme right the East African Mounted Rifles and a squadron of the 17th Cavalry advanced from Mue via Masai Kraal. The 3rd South African Brigade moved from Himo bridge on Euphorbien Hill, and the 2nd South African Brigade from the same point on Unterer Himo, to which place the 1st East African Brigade of the 2nd Division sent forward two battalions from Latema. The advance was supported by field and mountain artillery. The infantry occupied the line Euphorbien Hill-Unterer Himo without difficulty, while the East African Mounted Rifles encountered three enemy companies at Masai Kraal. During the day I ordered the 2nd East

African Brigade of the 1st Division from New Moschi to Mue, to support the mounted troops on the Kahe road.

21. On the 19th the general advance continued, but the 1st East African, 2nd and 3rd South African Brigades could make little progress through the well-nigh impenetrable bush which surrounded the enemy’s position on the Himo about Rasthaus. The 3rd Brigade, ably supported by the 28th Mountain Battery, had a sharp engagement with the enemy at dusk while occupying its line for the night, and sustained 30-40 casualties. The fresh graves of twenty-seven of the enemy’s askaris were afterwards found in the vicinity of the action. The 2nd East African Brigade and the mounted troops of the 1st Division under General Sheppard pushed the enemy back to Store, four miles south of Masai Kraal, and bivouacked there for the night. On the 20th I withdrew the 2nd South African Brigade from Unterer Himo, and sent three battalions to reinforce General Sheppard on the Mue-Kahe Road, where I anticipated the strongest opposition. At 2 p.m. on the 20th General Van Deventer, with the 1st South African Mounted Brigade, the 4th South African Horse, and two field batteries, left Moschi with instructions to cross the Pangani, and get in rear of the enemy’s position at Kahe Station. That night General Sheppard’s camp at Store was heavily attacked from 9.30 p.m. to midnight. These attacks were repulsed with loss to the enemy. The enemy force actually engaged was estimated by prisoners at 500 men, with another 500 in reserve. Their casualties were estimated at 70-100, ours were 20.

22. At daylight on the 21st Van Deventer was approaching the Pangani from the west at a point south-west of Kahe Hill. He experienced some difficulty in crossing the river, but by midday had occupied in succession Kahe Hill, Bauman Hill and Kahe Station with slight opposition. The enemy had already earlier in the day blown up the main railway bridge over the Ruwu (or Pangani).

After the loss of Kahe Hill the enemy realised its importance as the key to the Ruwu position, and made several determined attempts to recover it, which were, however, beaten back with loss. A mounted party which moved forward from Kahe Hill to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the wagon road south of the Ruwu found the enemy in force, and had to retire. Van Deventer therefore waited for the following day to develop the turning movement, after his whole brigade should have been brought across the Pangani. During the whole day the enemy had two 4.1-inch naval guns in action, one on a railway truck and the other from a concealed fixed position south of the Ruwu.

23. On the 21st General Sheppard had the following troops under his command:-

2nd East African Brigade.

25th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers.

29th Punjabis.

129th Baluchis.

2nd South African Brigade.

5th South African Battalion.

6th South African Battalion.

8th South African Battalion.

Divisional Troops.

East African Mounted Rifles.

1 Squadron 17th Cavalry.

1st and 3rd South African Field Artillery Batteries.

27th Mountain Battery.

No. 12 Howitzer Battery.

1st King’s African Rifles.

2 Royal Naval Armoured Cars.

As soon as I heard that General Van Deventer was nearing Kahe I ordered General Sheppard to advance. This he did at 11.30 a.m., with the 2nd South African Brigade on his right, and the 2nd East African Brigade on his left, the dividing line being the Masai Kraal-Kahe road. By 12.30 p.m. the enemy had been driven back on to his main position on the south edge of a clearing in the dense bush, with his east and west flanks protected respectively by the Soko Nassai and the Defu Rivers, both of which were considerable obstacles to the movements of infantry. General Sheppard’s intension was to attack the enemy frontally, and, with or without the aid of the 3rd South African Brigade, to envelop his right (eastern) flank. Unfortunately the advance of the 3rd Brigade from Euphorbien Hill was so impeded by the dense bush that it was unable to exercise any influence on the fight, and without its aid the task proved to be beyond the powers of the force at General Sheppard’s disposal. His infantry tried to cross the clearing, which varied in width from 600 to 1,200 yards, but the enemy’s dispositions were so skilfully made that these attempts were met and repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, both from front and flank. Two double companies of the 129th Baluchis crossed the Soko Nassai, and endeavoured to turn the enemy’s right, but here, too, they were held up. Our guns were well handled, the 27th Mountain Battery being in action in the actual firing line, but definite targets were difficult to obtain owing to the density of the bush. The whole force, in fact, was ably handled by General Sheppard, and the men fought like heroes, but they were unable to turn the enemy from his strong position. General Sheppard did not know that Van Deventer was already at Kahe Station, some miles in advance of his right flank, and no contact could be established through the intervening thick bush. He accordingly gave orders to dig in on the ground won, with a view to renewing the attack on the 22nd. At dawn on the 22nd patrols found the enemy gone. He had waited only for the cover of night to retire across the Ruwu River and proceed down the main road towards Lembeni, abandoning his stationary 4.1-inch gun, which had been blown up.

Our casualties at the Soko Nassai action were 288. It is not easy to estimate those of the enemy, but a large pile of used field-dressings found south of the Ruwu told a significant tale. As far as can be ascertained, the enemy forces employed on the 22nd were 14 or 15 companies, distributed along the Himo and Ruwu from Rasthaus to Kahe.

Besides the two 4.1-in. naval guns, the enemy employed several field guns and pompoms.

24. The result of these operations from the 18th to 21st March was to drive the enemy out of the country north of and along the Ruwu River. Aruscha had meanwhile been occupied by our mounted scouts, who drove off an enemy company in a southerly direction, and thus the conquest of the Kilimanjaro-Meru Area, probably the richest and most desirable district of German East Africa, was satisfactorily completed. I accordingly established my Headquarters at Moschi, placed a chain of outposts along the line of the Ruwu, and set to work to reorganise my force for the next move, meanwhile concentrating the troops as far as possible in healthy localities to give the men a rest after the hardships they had endured.

25. I am particularly indebted to the following officers for their services during the operations:-

Major-General M. J. Tighe, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., commanding the 2nd Division, loyally co-operated by carrying out my wishes in the spirit and the letter. He also commanded at the successful action at Latema nek. I have already mentioned his great services in paving the way for the offensive campaign.

Brigadier-General J. L. Van Deventer, commanding 1st South African Mounted Brigade, commanded throughout the operations an independent column, and executed the turning movements to which the rapidity of our success was undoubtedly due. He displayed soldierly qualities of a high order in controlling the mounted troops in their long night marches and manoeuvres through unknown and extremely difficult country.

The Air Services performed valuable reconnaissance work throughout the operations, and on several occasions considerably demoralised the enemy by the use of bombs.

The Royal Artillery were ably handled by Brigadier-General J. H. V. Crowe, and on all occasions when they had an opportunity of preparing the way for and covering the infantry advance their support was most effective.

The Supply and Transport Services worked with great zeal, and the fact that no hitch occurred in the supply of units scattered over such a large area is evidence of the efficiency displayed by all executive ranks. Such roads as do exist are merely clearings through the bush and swamp, and these rapidly become well-nigh impassable for heavy lorries. The existing track had constantly to be improved, and deviations cut, causing endless delays, and the result was that transport drivers were frequently at work continuously night and day.

The rapidity of the advance, and the distance to which it was carried, must almost inevitably have caused a breakdown in the transport had it not been for the unremitting exertions of the railway engineers, who carried forward the railway from the Njoro drift, east of Salaita, to Taveta and the Latema nek at an average rate of a mile a day, including surveying, heavy bush cutting and the bridging of the Lumi river. This fine performance is largely

due to the ripe experience and organising power of Colonel Sir W. Johns, Kt., C.I.E.

Exceptionally heavy work, too, has been thrown upon the medical officers and personnel. All wounded have been treated and evacuated expeditiously, and the number of sick who passed daily through the hands of the medical authorities, more especially since the cessation of active operations, has been very great. Great credit is due to Surgeon-General G. D. Hunter, C.M.G., D.S.O., and his assistants.

The excellent manner in which communication has been maintained throughout reflects great credit on my Signal Service, the officers and men of which, under the able control of Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hawtrey, R.E., have spared no efforts in overcoming the many difficulties attendant on operating in such country and on such a large front.

The Officers of my Staff have throughout rendered me every possible assistance. I would especially mentioned Colonel (now Brigadier-General) J. J. Collyer, my chief of the General Staff, whose sound judgment, ability and tact made possible the harmonious working of a curiously heterogeneous force, and Brigadier-General R. H. Ewart, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., Administrative Staff, who has done everything possible to perfect and coordinate the working of the various administrative services on which an army operating in equatorial Africa is peculiarly dependent.

Brigadier-General W. F. S. Edwards, D.S.O., my Inspector-General of Communications, rendered invaluable services, and the rapidity and smoothness with which the concentration of troops was carried out were very largely due to his energy and powers of organisation, while the manner in which he extended the lines of communication during the actual operations left nothing to be desired.

It is not easy for me to express my appreciation of the conduct of the troops during these operations. General and Staff Officers, Commanding, Regimental and Departmental Officers, rank and file and followers, British, South African, Indian and African, all have worked with a zeal and single-minded devotion to duty that is beyond praise. Shortage of transport necessitated the force moving on light scale, and the majority of the troops had no more than a waterproof sheet and a blanket for three weeks on end. Rations at times unavoidably ran short. Long marches in the hot sun and occasional drenching rains were calculated to try the most hardened campaigner. Yet all these hardships were endured with unfailing cheerfulness, and a chance of dealing a blow at the enemy seemed to be the only recompense required.

A list of those officers, N.C.O.’s and men whom I desire to bring to your Lordship’s special notice in connection with these operations will be forwarded at an early date.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship’s obedient servant,

J. C. SMUTS,

Lieutenant-General.

Commander-in-Chief, East African Force.

http://www.25throyalfusiliers.co.uk/east_africa_despatch_1.html via http://www.centenaryww1orange.com.au/events/20-june-1916/
_________________

"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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Percy Toplis



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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Jun 2018 10:45    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 June 1916 - Viscount Halifax delivered an address to an Anglo-Catholic Society

It seems to me that the remarks he made then to his fellow Anglicans apply now in so many parishes of the Catholic Church.

"How many feel when they are assisting at Mass that they are kneeling at our Lord's feet, beneath His Cross? That here is the offering which pleads for the whole world, for the sins of all, living and departed, the one offering of infinite worth we can make to "Our Father", the one offering which enables us to say with a sure confidence: "Look on the Face of thy Son, and only look on us as found in Him". Look on us who plead for the living and the dead that one Sacrifice offered by Him for all the sins of the world, past, present, and to come, that Offering by which Christ our Lord set Himself apart as the Victim for our salvation on the night of His Passion, that Offering completed on Calvary which is offered in all the plenitude of its power and efficacy wherever there is a priest to make the oblation of Christ's Body and Blood, and which has constituted the one great and abiding Sacrifice of the Christian Church since the Day of Pentecost. When this is not realized, no wonder that the altars of the Church are deserted. "I, if I am lifted up, will draw all men unto Me". How, if there is no consciousnes of that lifting up, no horror of the sins that necessitated so great an expiation, no sense of the need of the application of that expiation to ourselves, no perception that here and now the Lamb as it had been slain on Calvary is the one Offering that satisfies human needs and the cry of human souls? Surely, if there is any lack here, this is the point which most demands attention; surely here is the supreme object towards which all our efforts at improvement should be directed."

http://liturgicalnotes.blogspot.com/2016/06/20-june-1916.html
_________________

"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
Naar boven
Bekijk gebruikers profiel Stuur privé bericht
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