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20 Februari

 
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Hauptmann



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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2006 7:41    Onderwerp: 20 Februari Reageer met quote

Die Nachrichten vom 20. Februar

1914


1915
Starke Angriffe der Franzosen in der Champagne
Französische Stellungen in den Vogesen erstürmt
Der Winterfeldzug in Ostpreußen
Zurückdrängung der Russen in Südostgalizien
Der mißlungene Angriff auf die Dardanellen

1916
Eine englische Stellung am Yserkanal gestürmt
Flugplatz und Truppenlager von Furnes bombardiert
Durazzo im Halbkreis eingeschlossen
Feindliche Kriegsschiffe vor den Dardanellen beschossen

1917
Ein französischer Stützpunkt bei Transloy erstürmt
Französische Teilvorstöße abgewiesen
Zunehmendes Artilleriefeuer an der küstenländischen Front

1918
Der schnelle Vormarsch im Osten
Einrücken deutscher Truppen in Estland
Neues Friedensangebot der russischen Regierung

http://www.stahlgewitter.com
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Hauptmann



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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2006 7:42    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

February 20

1919 Amir of Afghanistan is assassinated

Habibullah Khan, the leader of Afghanistan who struggled to keep his country neutral in World War I in the face of strong internal support for Turkey and the Central Powers, is shot and killed while on a hunting trip on this day in 1919.

Habibullah had succeeded his father, Abd-ar-Rahman, as amir in 1901 and immediately began to bring much-needed reforms and modernization to his country, including electricity, automobiles and medicine. Located between British-held India and Russia, Afghanistan had in the past clashed repeatedly with its neighbors, including two Afghan Wars against Anglo-Indian forces in 1838–42 and 1878-79. Many within Afghanistan saw these conflicts as part of the fundamental and necessary defense of Muslims against the encroachments of Christians. Though the British and Russian governments signed a convention in 1907 pledging respect for the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, many Afghans—including Habibullah—felt insecure between such powerful neighbors and resented the lack of Afghan representation at the creation of the convention and the effective control Britain still exercised over the country’s foreign affairs due to its active involvement in the region.

Convinced, however, that the continued improvement and modernization of Afghanistan depended on economic assistance from powerful Western countries like Britain, Habibullah maintained his country’s neutrality after the outbreak of World War I, despite pressure from Turkish and other Islamic leaders urging Afghanistan to enter the war against the Allies. By maintaining his country’s neutrality and Afghanistan’s anti-war policy, Habibullah enraged many of his young anti-British countrymen who viewed World War I as a holy war. Many Afghans felt particularly strongly that Habibullah failed to capitalize on the weakness of Russia, which was overtaken by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, by uniting the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and liberating them from non-Muslim rule.

Barely a year after Turkey’s defeat at the hands of the Allies and the end of the war in November 1918, Habibullah’s opponents, angry at what they saw as his betrayal of Muslim interests in favor of pandering to Britain, plotted and carried out his assassination.

Habibullah had not declared a successor and after his death, his brother, Nasrullah Khan, held the throne for six days before being deposed by the Afghan nobility in favor of Habibullah’s third son, Amanullah Khan. Determined to extract Afghanistan completely from Britain’s influence, Amanullah declared war on Great Britain in May 1919, beginning what became known as the Third Afghan War. The British, preoccupied by India’s burgeoning independence movement, negotiated a peace treaty with Afghanistan the following August at Rawalpindi, recognizing Afghanistan’s status as a sovereign and independent state.

http://www.historychannel.com
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Percy Toplis



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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 21:23    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Wereldtentoonstelling 1915

The Panama-Pacific International Exposition (PPIE) was a world's fair held in San Francisco, California between February 20 and December 4 in 1915. Its ostensible purpose was to celebrate the completion of the Panama Canal, but it was widely seen in the city as an opportunity to showcase its recovery from the 1906 earthquake. The fair was constructed on a 635 acre (2.6 km²) site in San Francisco, along the northern shore now known as the Marina.

Lees het hele artikel op http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama%E2%80%93Pacific_International_Exposition

Voor foto's: http://www.sanfranciscomemories.com/ppie/panamapacific.html
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 21:51    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Saturday 20th February 1915- Diary of HV Reynolds

‘Obtained leave from 10am for 10pm, went out to Heliopolis and visited old mates in the 14th Battalion, all the 4th Brigade are camped at Heliopolis. Found Pete Hodgetts* in camp and we spent the evening at Luna Park.’

*Peter Hodgetts was from Ballarat, Victoria and part of the Division Signal Company 2, Section 2. Pete served in both the Gallipoli and Western Front campaigns but was killed in action on 7th July 1917 in France.

http://www.awm.gov.au/blog/2010/02/19/saturday-20th-february-1915-diary-of-hv-reynolds/
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 22:07    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

1915 Tuscania

In January of 1915 the ship is christen S.S. Tuscania and the traditional bottle of Champagne is broken on the bow. The Tuscania is launched into service. On the maiden voyage the Tuscania arrived in New York February 16, 1915. The ship returned to Glasgow, Scotland February 20th 1915. The Ship continued sailing between New York and British ports as a passenger and supply ship.

Lees het hele verhaal (inclusief fotogalerij) op http://renton.50megs.com/Tuscania/1915.htm
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 22:44    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Casualty Lists of the Royal Navy and Dominion Navies, World War 1

Gavenwood, hired net drifter, mined and sunk in Adriatic
BLAIR, Henry S, 2nd Hand, RNR, SA 983
HENDRY, Francis, Engineman, RNR, ES 1832
KERMACK, William R, Engineman, RNR, ES 3315
LYALL, William, Ty/Skipper, RNR
MCKAY, Alexander, Deck Hand, RNR, DA 3371
MILNE, James, Trimmer, RNR, TS 3248
REID, George, Cook, RNR, TC 423
RITCHIE, James C, Deck Hand, RNR, DA 3107
SIMPSON, Robert, Trimmer, RNR, TS 4334
WATCHMAN, Collingwood, Act/Lieutenant, RNR
YOUNG, Claud, Deck Hand, RNR, SD 1457

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKCas1916-02Feb.htm
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 22:48    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

1916 - Edward Packe's diary of World War I

Feb 20th. Do a reconnaissance in the morning, two holes in the aircraft. Cake from home. Go into Cassel in evening and dine with Hugh Rendall.

http://gwydir.demon.co.uk/diaries/diary1916.htm
Móóie site! http://gwydir.demon.co.uk/diaries/index.htm
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"Omdat ik alles beter weet is het mijn plicht om betweters te minachten."
Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2010 23:34    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Feb 20th, 1917

Ammunitions ship explodes in Archangelsk harbor, about 1,500 die

http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1917
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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Stosstrupp 1917 (Shock Troop) DVD

An enormous box-office hit upon its release on 20 February 1934, Stosstrupp 1917 was based on director Zoberlein’s own war memoirs, Der Glaube an Deutschland, to which Adolf Hitler contributed a foreword; was financed by the National Socialist government; and featured Wehrmacht and SA troops in its cast.

Lees alles... http://www.ihffilm.com/33098.html
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Marcel Wauters, Vlaams schrijver en kunstenaar 1921-2005
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Sir Douglas Haig's 5th Despatch (Cambrai Operations), 20 February 1918

Reproduced is the text of Sir Douglas Haig's fifth despatch as British Army Commander-in-Chief, dated 20 February 1918. It summarises details of operations at Cambrai during November and December 1917.

General Headquarters,
British Armies in the Field,
20th February, 1918

My Lord;

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the operations on the Cambrai front during November and December, 1917.

General Plan
1. As pointed out in my last Despatch, the object of these operations was to gain a local success by a sudden attack at a point where the enemy did not expect it.

Our repeated attacks in Flanders and those of our Allies elsewhere had brought about large concentrations of the enemy's forces on the threatened fronts, with a consequent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of his line.

Of these weakened sectors the Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise operation in contemplation. The ground there was, on the whole, favourable for the employment of tanks which were to play an important part in the enterprise, and facilities existed for the concealment of the necessary preparations for the attack.

If, after breaking through the German defence systems on this front, we could secure Bourlon to the north and establish a good flank position to the east, in the direction of Cambrai, we should be well placed to exploit the situation locally between Bourlon and the Sensee River and to the north-west.

The capture of Cambrai itself was subsidiary to this operation, the object of our advance towards that town being primarily to cover our flank and puzzle the enemy regarding our intentions.

The enemy was laying out fresh lines of defence behind those which he had already completed on the Cambrai front; and it was to be expected that his troops would be redistributed as soon as our pressure in Flanders was relaxed.

He had already brought large forces from Russia in exchange for divisions exhausted in the struggle in the Western theatre, and it was practically certain that heavy reinforcements would be brought from East to West during the winter. Moreover his tired divisions, after a winter's rest, would recover their efficiency.

For all these reasons, if the existing opportunity for a surprise attack were allowed to lapse, it would probably be many months before an equally favourable one would again offer itself. Furthermore, having regard to the future, it was desirable to show the enemy that he could not with impunity reduce his garrisons beyond a certain point without incurring grave risks.

Against these arguments in favour of immediate action I had to weigh the fact that my own troops had been engaged for many months in heavy fighting, and that, though their efforts had been uniformly successful, the conditions of the struggle had greatly taxed their strength.

Only part of the losses in my divisions had been replaced, and many recently arrived drafts, still far from being fully trained, were included in the ranks of the Armies. Under these conditions it was a serious matter to make a further heavy call on my troops at the end of such a strenuous year.

On the other hand, from the nature of the operation, the size of the force which could be employed was bound, in any case, to be comparatively small, since success depended so much on secrecy, and it is impossible to keep secret the concentration of very large forces. The demand made upon my resources, therefore, should not be a great one.

While considering these different factors, preparations were
quietly carried on, so that all might be ready for the attack if I found it possible to carry it out. The success of the enemy's offensive in Italy subsequently added great force to the arguments in favour of undertaking the operation, although the means at my disposal for the purpose were further reduced as a consequence of the Italian situation.

Eventually I decided that, despite the various limiting factors, I could muster enough force to make a first success sufficiently sure to justify undertaking the attack, but that the degree to which this success could be followed up must depend on circumstances.

It was calculated that, provided secrecy could be maintained to the last moment, no large hostile reinforcements were likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the commencement of the attack. I informed General Sir Julian Byng, to whom the execution of the plans in connection with the Cambrai operations was entrusted, that the advance would be stopped by me after that time, or sooner if necessary, unless the results then gained and the general situation justified its continuance.

The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous artillery preparation, and to depend instead on tanks to smash through the enemy's wire, of which there was a great quantity protecting his trenches.

As soon as the advance of the tanks and infantry, working in close co-operation, began, the artillery was to assist with counter-battery and barrage work; but no previous registration of guns for this purpose could be permitted, as it would rouse the enemy's suspicions. The artillery of our new Armies was therefore necessarily subjected to a severe test in this operation, and proved itself entirely worthy of the confidence placed in it.

The infantry, tanks and artillery thus working in combination
were to endeavour to break through all the enemy's lines of defence on the first day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation developed favourably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganise his system of command, damage his railways and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of his reinforcements.

It was explained to all Commanders that everything depended on secrecy up to the moment of starting, and after that on bold, determined and rapid action. Unless opposition could be beaten down quickly, no great results could be looked for.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, to whom I secretly communicated my plans, most readily agreed to afford me every assistance. In addition to the steps taken by him to engage the enemy's attention elsewhere, he arranged for a strong force of French infantry and cavalry to be in a position whence they could be moved forward rapidly to take part in the exploitation of our success, if the
situation should render it possible to bring them into action.

On the 20th November certain of these French units were actually put in motion. The course of events, however, did not open out the required opportunity for their employment, but the French forces were held in readiness and within easy reach so long as there appeared to be any hope of it.

Had the situation on the 20th November developed somewhat more favourably in certain directions, the nature of which will become apparent in the course of this report, the presence and co-operation of these French troops would have been of the greatest value.

The Enemy's Defences
2. The German defences on this front had been greatly improved and extended since the opening of our offensive in April, and comprised three main systems of resistance.

The first of these three trench systems, constituting part of the Hindenburg Line proper, ran in a general north-westerly direction for a distance of six miles from the Canal de l'Escaut at Banteux to Havrincourt. There it turned abruptly north along the line of the Canal du Nord for a distance of four miles to Moeuvres, thus forming a pronounced salient in the German front.

In advance of the Hindenburg Line the enemy had constructed a series of strong forward positions, including La Vacquerie and the north-eastern corner of Havrincourt Wood. Behind it, and at distances respectively varying from a little less to rather more than a mile, and from three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half miles, lay the second and third main German systems, known as the Hindenburg Reserve Line, and the Beaurevoir, Masnieres, Marquion Lines.

The Attack
3. All necessary preparations were completed in time, and with a secrecy reflecting the greatest credit on all concerned. At 6.20 a.m. on the 20th November, without any previous artillery bombardment, tanks and infantry attacked on a front of about six miles from east of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord opposite Hermies.

At the same hour, demonstrations with gas, smoke and artillery took place on practically the whole of the British front south of the Scarpe, and subsidiary attacks were launched east of Epehy and between Bullecourt and Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.

On the principal front of attack, the tanks moved forward in
advance of the infantry, crushing down the enemy's wire and forming great lanes through which our infantry could pass. Protected by smoke barrages from the view of the enemy's artillery, they rolled on across the German trenches, smashing up the enemy's machine guns and driving his infantry to ground.

Close behind our tanks our own infantry followed and, while the tanks patrolled the line of hostile trenches, cleared the German infantry from their dug-outs and shelters.

In this way, both the main system of the Hindenburg Line and its outer defences were rapidly over-run, and tanks and infantry proceeded in accordance with programme to the attack upon the Hindenburg Reserve Line.

In this advance, the 12th (Eastern) Divisions (Major-General A. B. Scott), moving along the Bonavis Ridge on the right of our attack, encountered obstinate resistance at Lateau Wood, which sheltered a number of German batteries. Fierce fighting, in which infantry and tank crews displayed the greatest gallantry, continued throughout the morning at this point, and ended in the capture of the position, together with the enemy's guns.

Meanwhile, the 20th (Light) Division (Major-General W. D. Smith), which had captured La Vacquerie at the opening of its attack, stormed the powerful defences of Welsh Ridge. The 6th Division (Major-General T. O. Marden) carried the village of Ribetourt, after sharp fighting among the streets and houses, while the 62nd (West Riding) Division (T.) (Major-General W. P. Braithwaite) stormed Havrincourt, where also parties of the enemy held out for a time.

The capture of these two villages secured the flanks of the 51st (Highland) Division (T.) (Major-General G. M. Harper), advancing on the left centre of our attack up the slopes of Flesquieres Hill against the German trench lines on the southern side of Flesquieres Village. Here very heavy fighting took place. The stout brick wall skirting the Chateau grounds opposed a formidable obstacle to our advance, while German machine guns swept the approaches.

A number of tanks were knocked out by direct hits from German field batteries in position beyond the crest of the hill. None the less, with the exception of the village itself, our second objectives in this area were gained before midday.

Many of the hits upon our tanks at Flesquieres were obtained by a German artillery officer who, remaining alone at his battery, served a field gun single-handed until killed at his gun. The great bravery of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks!

On the left of our attack west of the Canal du Nord, the 36th (Ulster) Division (Major-General 0. S. W. Nugent), captured a German strong point on the spoil bank of the canal and pushed northwards in touch with the West Riding troops, who, as the first stage in a most gallant and remarkably successful advance, had taken Havrincourt.

By 10.30 a.m. the general advance beyond the Hindenburg Reserve Line to our final objectives had begun, and cavalry were moving up behind our infantry.

In this period of the attack tanks and British infantry battalions of the 29th Division (Major-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle) entered Masnieres and captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the passages of the Canal de l'Escaut at both villages.

At Marcoing the tanks arrived at the moment when a party of the enemy were in the act of running out an electrical connection to blow up one of the bridges. This party was fired on by a tank and the bridges secured intact. At Masnieres, however, the retreating enemy succeeded in destroying partially the bridge carrying the main road. In consequence the first tank which endeavoured to cross at this point fell through the bridge, completing its destruction.

The advance of a number of our guns had been unavoidably delayed in the sunken roads which served this part of the battle-field, and though our infantry continued their progress beyond Masnieres, without the assistance of tanks and artillery they were not able at first to clear the enemy entirely from the northern portion of the village.

Here parties of Germans held out during the afternoon, and gave the enemy time to occupy Rumilly and the section of the Beaure-voir-Masnieres line south of it; while the destruction of the bridge also prevented the cavalry from crossing the canal in sufficient strength to overcome his resistance.

In spite of this difficulty, a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, Canadian Cavalry Brigade (5th Cavalry Division, Major-General H. I. M. Macandrew), succeeded during the afternoon in crossing the canal by a temporary bridge constructed during the day. This squadron passed through the Beaurevoir-Masnieres line and charged and captured a German battery in position to the east of it.

Continuing its advance, it dispersed a body of about 300 German infantry, and did not cease its progress until the greater part of its horses had been killed or wounded. The squadron thereupon took up a position in a sunken road, where it maintained itself until night fell. It then withdrew to our lines, bringing with it several prisoners taken in the course of a most gallant exploit.

Meanwhile, west of the Canal de l'Escaut patrols of the 6th Division during the afternoon entered Noyelles-sur-l'Escaut, where they were reinforced by cavalry, and other cavalry units pushed out towards Cantaing. West of Flesquieres, the 62nd Division, operating northwards from Havrincourt, made important progress.

Having carried the Hindenburg Reserve Line north of that village, it rapidly continued its attack and captured Graincourt, where two anti-tank guns were destroyed by the tanks accompanying our infantry. Before nightfall infantry and cavalry had entered Anneux, though the enemy's resistance in this village does not appear to have been entirely overcome until the following morning.

This attack of the 62nd (West Riding) Division constitutes a
brilliant achievement, in which the troops concerned completed an advance of four and a half miles from their original front, overrunning two German systems of defence and gaining possession of three villages.

On the left flank of our attack Ulster battalions pushed northwards along the Hindenburg Line and its forward defences, maintaining touch with the West Riding troops, and carried the whole of the German trench systems west of the Canal du Nord as far north as the Bapaume-Cambrai Road.

At the end of the first day of the attack, therefore, three German systems of defence had been broken through to a depth of some four and a half miles on a wide front, and over 5,000 prisoners had already been brought in. But for the wrecking of the bridge at Masnieres and the check at Flesquieres, still greater results might have been attained.

Throughout these operations the value of the services rendered by the tanks was very great, and the utmost gallantry, enterprise and resolution were displayed by both officers and crews. In combination with the other arms they helped to make possible a remarkable success.

Without their aid in opening a way through the German wire, success could only have been attained by methods which would have given the enemy ample warning of our attack, and have allowed him time to mass troops to oppose it. As has been pointed out above, to enable me to undertake such an operation with the troops at my disposal, secrecy to the last moment was essential.

The tanks alone made fit possible to dispense with artillery preparation, and so to conceal our intentions from the enemy up to the actual moment of attack.

Great credit is due also to the Royal Flying Corps for very gallant and most valuable work carried out under conditions of the greatest difficulty from low clouds and driving mist.

In the subsidiary attack at Bullecourt battalions of the 3rd Division (Major-General C. J. Deverell) and the 16th (Irish) Division (Major-General W. B. Hickie) successfully completed the work begun by our operations in this area in May and June, 1917, capturing the remainder of the Hindenburg support trench on their front, with some 700 prisoners.

A number of counter-attacks against our new positions at Bullecourt on this and the following day were repulsed, with great loss to the enemy.

The Advance Continued
4. On the morning of the 21st November the attack on Flesquieres was resumed, and by 8.0 a.m. the village had been turned from the north-west and captured. The obstacle which more than anything else had limited the results of the 20th November was thereby removed, and later in the morning the advance once more became general.

Masnieres had been cleared of the enemy during the previous evening, and at 11.0 a.m. our troops attacked the Beaurevoir-Masnieres line and established themselves in the portion to the east and north of Masnieres. Heavy fighting took place, and a counter-attack from the direction of Rumilly was beaten off.

At the same hour we attacked and captured Les Rues des Vignes, but later in the morning the enemy counter-attacked and compelled our troops to fall back from this position. Progress was also made towards Creve-Coeur; but though the canal was crossed during the afternoon, it was found impossible to force the passage of the river in face of the enemy's machine gun fire.

That evening orders were issued by the Third Army to secure the ground already gained in this area of the battle, and to capture Rumilly on the morrow; but in consequence of the exhaustion of the troops engaged it was found necessary later in the night to cancel the orders for this attack.

West of the Canal de l'Escaut infantry of the 29th Division and dismounted regiments of the Ist and 5th Cavalry Divisions; including the Ambala Brigade, were heavily engaged throughout the day in Noyelles, and beat off all attacks in continuous fighting.

Following upon the capture of Flesquieres, the 51st and 62nd Divisions, in co-operation with a number of tanks and squadrons of the 1st Cavalry Division, attacked at 10.30 a.m. in the direction of Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon.

In this attack the capture of Anneux was completed, and early in the afternoon Cantaing was seized, with some hundreds of prisoners. Progress was made on the outskirts of Bourlon Wood, and late in the afternoon Fontaine-notre-Dame was taken by troops of the 51st Division and tanks. The attack on Bourlon Wood itself was checked by machine gun fire, though tanks advanced some distance into the wood.

Farther west, the 36th Division advanced north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, and reached the southern outskirts of Moeuvres, where strong opposition was encountered.

The Position on the 21st November
5. On the evening of the second day of the attack, therefore, our troops held a line which ran approximately as follows:-

From our old front line east of Gonnelieu the right flank of our new positions lay along the eastern slopes of the Bonavis Ridge, passing east of Lateau Wood and striking the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line north of the Canal de l'Escaut at a point about half way between Crevecoeur and Masnieres. From this point our line ran roughly north-west, past and including Masnieres, Noyelles and Cantaing, to Fontaine, also inclusive.

Thence it bent back to the south for a short distance, making a sharp salient round the latter village, and ran in a general westerly direction along the southern edge of Bourlon Wood and across the southern face of the spur to the west of the wood, to the Canal du Nord, south-east of the village of Moeuvres. From Moeuvres the line linked up once more with our old front at a point about midway between Boursies and Pronville.

The forty-eight hours after which it had been calculated that the enemy's reserves would begin to arrive had in effect expired, and the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as well as certain important tactical features to the east and west of the wood, still remained in the enemy's possession.

It now became necessary to decide whether to continue the operation offensively or to take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been attained.

The Decision to Go On
6. It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquieres were completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless this ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the Flesquieres Ridge would be necessary and would have to be carried out at once.

On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensee River.

The enemy's defensive lines south of the Scarpe and Sensee Rivers would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of it.

The successive days of constant marching and fighting had placed a very severe strain upon the endurance of the troops, and, before a further advance could be undertaken, some time would have to be spent in resting and relieving them. This need for delay was regrettable, as the enemy's forces were increasing, and fresh German divisions were known to be arriving, but, with the limited number of troops at my command, it was unavoidable.

It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no more than enough to replace the enemy's losses; and although the right of our advance had definitely been stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal.

As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a large extent achieved.

An additional and very important argument in favour of proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what measure of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of strength the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good.

After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position. The 22nd November was spent in organising the captured ground, in carrying out certain reliefs, and in giving other troops the rest they already needed.

Soon after midday the enemy regained Fontaine-notre-Dame; but, with our troops already on the outskirts of Bourlon Wood and Cantaing held by us, it was thought that
the recapture of Fontaine should not prove very difficult. The necessary arrangements for renewing the attack were therefore pushed on and our plans were extended to include the recapture of Fontaine-notre-Dame.

Meanwhile, early in the night of the 22nd November, a battalion of the Queen's Westminsters (56th Division, Major-General F. A. Dudgeon) stormed a commanding tactical point in the Hindenburg Line west of Moeuvres known as Tadpole Copse, the possession of which would be of value in connection with the left flank of the Bourlon position when the latter had been secured.

The Struggle for Bourlon Wood
7. On the morning of the 23rd November the 51st Division, supported by tanks, attacked Fontaine-notre-Dame, but was unable to force an entrance. Early in the afternoon this division repeated its attack from the west, and a number of tanks entered Fontaine, where they remained till dusk, inflicting considerable loss on the enemy.

We did not succeed, however, in clearing the village, and at the end of the day no progress had been made on this part of our front.

At 10.30 a.m. the 40th Division (Major-General I. Ponsonby) attacked Bourlon Wood, and after four and a half hours of hard fighting, in which tanks again rendered valuable assistance to our infantry, captured the whole of the wood and entered Bourlon Village. Here hostile counter-attacks prevented our further progress, and though the village was at one time reported to have been taken by us, this proved later to be erroneous.

A heavy hostile attack upon our positions in the wood, in which all three battalions of the 9th Grenadier Regiment appear to have been employed, was completely repulsed.

Throughout this day, also, the 36th Division and troops of the 56th (London) Division (T.) were engaged in stubborn fighting in the neighbourhood of Moeuvres and Tadpole Copse, and made some progress.

This struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fiercely contested fighting, in which English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish battalions, together with dismounted cavalry, performed most gallant service and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.

During the morning of the 24th November the enemy twice attacked, and at his second attempt pressed back our troops in the north-eastern corner of the wood. An immediate counter-attack delivered by the I4th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 15th Hussars, dismounted, and the remnants of the 119th Infantry Brigade (4oth Division and Ist Cavalry Division), drove back the enemy in turn, and by noon our line had been re-established.

Meanwhile, dismounted cavalry had repulsed an attack on the high ground west of Bourlon Wood, and in the afternoon a third hostile attack upon the wood was stopped by our artillery and rifle fire.

On this afternoon our infantry again attacked Bourlon Village, and captured the whole of it. Later in the evening a fourth attack upon our positions in the wood was beaten off after fierce fighting. Further progress was made on this day in the Hindenburg Line west of Moeuvres, but the enemy's resistance in the whole of this area was very strong.

On the evening of the 25th November a fresh attack by the enemy regained Bourlon Village, though our troops offered vigorous resistance, and parties of the 13th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment (40th Division), held out in the south-east corner of the village until touch was re-established with them two days later.

The continual fighting and the strength of the enemy's attacks, however, had told heavily on the 40th Division, which had borne the brunt of the struggle. This division was accordingly withdrawn, and on the following day our troops were again pressed back slightly in the northern outskirts of Bourlon Wood.

With the enemy in possession of the shoulder of the ridge above Fontaine-notre-Dame, as well as of part of the high ground west of Bourlon Wood, our position in the wood itself was a difficult one, and much of the ground to the south of it was still exposed to the enemy's observation. It was decided, therefore, to make another effort on the 27th November to capture Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon Village, and to gain possession of the whole of the Bourlon Ridge.

In this attack, in which tanks co-operated, British Guards (Major- General G. P. T. Feilding) temporarily regained possession of Fontaine-notre-Dame, taking some hundreds of prisoners, and troops of the 62nd Division once more entered Bourlon Village.

Later in the morning, however, heavy counter-attacks developed in both localities, and our troops were unable to maintain the ground they had gained. During the afternoon the enemy also attacked our positions at Tadpole Copse, but was repulsed.

As the result of five days of constant fighting, therefore, we held a strong position on the Bourlon Hill and in the wood, but had not yet succeeded in gaining all the ground required for the security of this important feature. The two following days passed comparatively quietly, while the troops engaged were relieved and steps were undertaken to prepare for a deliberate attack which might give us the tactical points we sought.

Meanwhile, on other parts of the front the organisation of our new positions was proceeding as rapidly as conditions would allow. In particular, troops of the 12th Division had effected some improvement on the right flank of our advance opposite Banteux, and the 16th Division had made further progress in the Hindenburg Line north-west of Bullecourt.

At the end of November the number of prisoners taken in our operations south-west of Cambrai exceeded 10,500. We had also captured 142 guns, some 350 machine guns, and 70 trench mortars, with great quantities of ammunition, material and stores of all kinds.

The German Attack
Early Warnings
8. During the last days of November increased registration of hostile artillery, the movements of troops and transport observed behind the German lines, together with other indications of alike nature, pointed to further efforts by the enemy to regain the positions we had wrested from him.

The front affected by this increased activity included that of our advance, as well as the ground to Vendhuille and beyond. The massing of the enemy's infantry, however, his obvious anxiety concerning the security of his defences south of the Sensee River, the tactical importance of the high ground about Bourlon, and the fact that we were still only in partial possession of it, all pointed to the principal attack being delivered in the Bourlon sector.

Our Dispositions for Defence
9. Measures were accordingly taken, both by the Third Army and by the lower formations concerned, to prepare for eventualities.

Arrangements had been made after our last attack to relieve the troops holding the Bourlon positions by such fresh divisions as were available, and when these reliefs had been satisfactorily completed, I felt confident that the defence of this sector could be considered secure.

Covering our right flank from Cantaing to the Banteux Ravine, a distance of about 16,000 yards, five British divisions were disposed, and, though these had been fighting for several days and were consequently tired, I felt confident that they would prove equal to stopping any attack the enemy could make on them.

From the Banteux Ravine southwards the divisions in line were weak and held very extended fronts. On the other hand, the line held by us in this southern sector had been in our possession for some months. Its defences were for this reason more complete and better organised than those of the ground gained by us in our attack. Moreover, the capture of the Bonavis Ridge had added to the security of our position farther south.

The reserve divisions immediately available in the area consisted of the Guards and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (Major-General W. H. Greenly commanding 2nd Cavalry Division), both of which had been engaged in the recent fighting at Fontaine and Bourlon Wood.

These were located behind the La Vacquerie-Villers Guislain front, while another division, the 62nd, which had also been recently engaged, was placed farther to the north-west in the direction of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. A fresh South Midland division (61st Division, Major-General C. I. Mackenzie) was assembling farther back, two other cavalry divisions were within two or three hours march of the battle area, and another cavalry division but a little farther distant.

In view of the symptoms of activity observed on the enemy's front, special precautions were taken by local commanders, especially from Villers Guislain to the south. Troops were warned to expect attack, additional machine guns were placed to secure supporting points, and divisional reserves were closed up. Special patrols were also sent out to watch for signs of any hostile advance.

The Battle Reopened
10. Between the hours of 7.0 and 8.0 a.m. on the last days of November the enemy attacked, after a short but intense artillery preparation, on the greater part of a front of some ten miles from Vendhuille to Masnieres inclusive. From Masnieres to Banteux, both inclusive, four German divisions would seem to have been employed against the three British divisions holding this area (29th, 20th and 12th Divisions).

Between Banteux exclusive and Vendhuille one German division and portions of two others were employed against the northern half of the British division holding that front (the 55th Division, Major-General H. S. Jeudwine).

On the Masnieres front the 29th Division, composed of English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Guernsey and Newfoundland battalions, although seriously threatened as the day wore on by the progress made by the enemy farther south, where their battery positions had been taken in reverse, most gallantly beat off a succession of powerful assaults and maintained their line intact.

At the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which the advance of the enemy's infantry followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both in line and in immediate support, almost before they had realised that the attack had begun.

The nature of the bombardment, which seems to have been
heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously alarming them, contributed to the success of the enemy's plans. No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the many deep folds and hollows typical of a chalk formation, and shielded from observation from the air by an early morning mist.

Only when the attack was upon them great numbers of low-flying German aeroplanes rained machine gun fire upon our infantry, while an extensive use of smoke shell and bombs made it extremely difficult for our troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battlefield, or to follow the movements of the enemy.

In short, there is little doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in these areas of the battle at the moment of delivery the assault effected a local surprise.

None the less, stubborn resistance was offered during the morning by isolated parties of our troops and by machine gun detachments in the neighbourhood of Lateau Wood and south-east of La Vacquerie, as well as at other points. In more than one instance heavy losses are known to have been inflicted on the enemy by machine gun fire at short range.

North-east of La Vacquerie the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade (20th Division) repulsed four attacks, in some of which the enemy's infantry approached to within 200 yards of our guns, before the surviving gunners were finally compelled to withdraw, after removing the breech-blocks from their pieces.

East of Villers Guislain the troops holding our forward positions on the high ground were still offering a strenuous resistance to the enemy's attack on their front, at a time when large forces of German infantry had already advanced up the valley between them and Villers Guislain.

South of this village a single strong point known as Limerick Post, garrisoned by troops of the 1/5th Battalion (King's Own), Royal Lancaster Regiment, and the 1/10th Battalion, Liverpool Regiment (both of the 55th Division), held out with great gallantry throughout the day, though heavily attacked.

The progress made by the enemy, however, across the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and up the deep gully between Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu, known as 22 Ravine, turned our positions on the ridge as well as in both villages. Taken in flank and rear, the defences of Villers Guislain, Gonnelieu and Bonavis were rapidly over-run.

Gouzeaucourt was captured about 9.0 a.m., the outer defences of La Vacquerie were reached, and a number of guns which had been brought up close to the line, in order to enable them to cover the battle-front about Masnieres and Marcoing, fell into the hands of the enemy.

At this point the enemy's advance was checked by the action of our local reserves, and meanwhile measures had been taken with all possible speed to bring up additional troops. About midday the Guards came into action west of Gouzeaucourt, while cavalry (4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, Major-General A. A. Kennedy commanding 4th Cavalry Division) moved up to close the gap on their right and made progress towards Villers Guislain from the south and south-west.

The attack of the Guards, which was delivered with the greatest gallantry and resolution, drove the enemy out of Gouzeaucourt and made progress on the high ground known as the St. Quentin Ridge, east of the village. In this operation the Guards were materially assisted by the gallant action of a party of the 29th Division, who, with a company of North Midland Royal Engineers, held on throughout the day to a position in an old trench near Gouzeaucourt.

Valuable work was also done by a brigade of field artillery of the 47th Division, which moved direct into action from the line of march.

During the afternoon three battalions of tanks, which when they received news of the attack were preparing to move away from the battlefield to refit, arrived at Gouzeaucourt and aided the infantry to hold the recaptured ground. Great credit is due to the officers and men of the Tank Brigade concerned for the speed with which they brought their tanks into action.

Meanwhile, the defence of La Vacquerie had been successfully maintained, and our line had been established to the north of that village, in touch with our troops in Masnieres.

The Northern Attack
11. In the northern area, from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Tadpole Copse, the German attack was not launched until some two hours later. This was the enemy's main attack, and was carried out with large forces and great resolution.

After a heavy preliminary bombardment, and covered by an artillery barrage, the enemy's infantry advanced shortly after 9.0 a.m. in dense waves, in the manner of his attacks in the first battle of Ypres.

In the course of the morning and afternoon no less than five principal attacks were made in this area, and on one portion of the attack as many as' eleven waves of German infantry advanced successively to the assault. On the whole of this front a resolute endeavour was made to break down by sheer weight of numbers the defence of the London Territorials and other English battalions holding the sector.

In this fighting the 47th (London) Division (T.) (Major-General Sir G. F. Gorringe), the 2nd Division (Major-General C. E. Pereira) and the 56th (London) Division (T.) greatly distinguished themselves, and there were accomplished many deeds of great heroism.

Under the fury of the enemy's bombardment a company of the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, were in the course of being withdrawn from an exposed position in a sap-head in advance of our line between Bourlon Wood and Moeuvres when the German attack burst upon them.

The officer in command sent three of his platoons back, and with a rearguard composed of the remainder of his company held off the enemy's infantry until the main position had been organised. Having faithfully accomplished their task, this rearguard died fighting to the end with their faces to the enemy.

Somewhat later in the morning an attack in force between the Canal du Nord and Moeuvres broke into our foremost positions and isolated a company of the 13th Battalion, Essex Regiment, in a trench just west of the canal. After maintaining a splendid and successful resistance throughout the day, whereby the pressure upon our main line was greatly relieved, at 4.0 p.m. this company held a council of war, at which the two remaining company officers, the company sergeant-major, and the platoon sergeants were present, and unanimously determined to fight to the last and have "no surrender".

Two runners who were sent to notify this decision to Battalion Headquarters succeeded in getting through to our lines and delivered their message. During the remainder of the afternoon and far into the following night this gallant company were heard fighting, and there is little room for doubt that they carried out to a man their heroic resolution.

Early in the afternoon large masses of the enemy again attacked west of Bourlon Wood, and, though beaten off with great loss at most points, succeeded in overwhelming three out of a line of posts held by a company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berks Regiment, on the right of the 2nd Division.

Though repeatedly attacked by vastly superior numbers the remainder of these posts stood firm, and when, two days later, the three posts which had been overpowered were regained, such a heap of German dead lay in and around them that the bodies of our own men were hidden.

All accounts go to show that the enemy's losses in the whole of his constantly repeated attacks on this sector of the battle front were enormous. One battery of eight machine guns fired 70,000 rounds of ammunition into ten successive waves of Germans.

Long lines of attacking infantry were caught by our machine gun fire in enfilade, and were shot down in line as they advanced. Great execution also was done by our field artillery, and in the course of the battle guns were brought up to the crest line and fired direct upon the enemy at short range.

At one point west of Bourlon the momentum of his first advance i carried the enemy through our front line and a short way down the southern slopes of the ridge. There, however, the German masses came under direct fire from our field artillery at short range and were broken up.

Our local reserves at once counter-attacked, and succeeded in closing the gap that had been made in our line. Early in the afternoon the enemy again forced his way into our foremost positions in this locality, opening a gap between the 1/6th Battalion and the 1/15th Battalion, London Regiments. Counter-attacks, led by the two battalion commanders, with all available men, including the personnel of their headquarters, once more restored the situation. All other attacks were beaten off with the heaviest losses to the enemy.

The greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnieres, Bourlon and Moeuvres for the very gallant service performed by them on this day. But for their steady courage and staunchness in defence, the success gained by the enemy on the right of our battle front might have had serious consequences.

I cannot close the account of this day's fighting without recording my obligation to the Commander-in-Cheef of the French Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops within reach for employment in case of need at the unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander.

Part of the artillery of this force actually came into action, rendering valuable service, and though the remainder of the troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were available should occasion arise was a great assistance.

The Fighting at Gonnelieu and Masnieres
12. On the 1st December fighting continued fiercely on the whole front.

The Guards completed the capture of the St. Quentin Ridge and entered Gonnelieu, where they captured over 350 prisoners and a large number of machine guns. Tanks took an effective part in the fighting for the ridge. At one point, where our infantry were held up by fire from a hostile trench, a single tank attacked and operated up and down the trench, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's garrison.

Our infantry were then able to advance and secure the trench, which was found full of dead Germans. In it were also found fifteen machine guns that had been silenced by the tank. In the whole of this fighting splendid targets were obtained by all tank crews, and the German casualties were seen to be very great.

Farther south, a number of tanks co-operated with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards in the attacks upon Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood, and were in great measure responsible for the capture of the wood.

Heavy fighting took place for this position, which it is clear the enemy had decided to hold at all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine guns were found. In one spot four German machine guns, with dead crews lying round, were discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three German field guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this wood.

Other tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and, in spite of heavy direct artillery fire, three reached the outskirts of the village, but the fire of the enemy's machine guns prevented our troops advancing from the south from supporting them, and the tanks ultimately withdrew.

Severe fighting took place, also, at Masnieres. During the afternoon and evening at least nine separate attacks were beaten off by the 29th Division on this front, and other hostile attacks were repulsed in the neighbourhood of Marcoing, Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon. With the Bonavis Ridge in the enemy's hands, however, Masnieres was exposed to attack on three sides, and on the night of the 1st/2nd December our troops were withdrawn under orders to a line west of the village.

On the afternoon of the 2nd December a series of heavy attacks developed against Welsh Ridge in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie, and further assaults were made on our positions in the neighbourhood of Masnieres and Bourlon.

These attacks were broken in succession by our machine gun fire, but the enemy persisted in his attempts against Welsh Ridge and gradually gained ground. By nightfall our line had been pushed back to a position west and north of Gonnelieu.

Next day the enemy renewed his attacks in great force on the whole front from Gonnelieu to Marcoing, and ultimately gained possession of La Vacquerie. North of La Vacquerie repeated attacks made about Masnieres and Marcoing were repulsed in severe fighting, but the positions still retained by us beyond the Canal de l'Escaut were extremely exposed, and during the night our troops were withdrawn under orders to the west bank of the canal.

The Withdrawal from Bourlon
13. By this time the enemy had evidently become exhausted by the efforts he had made and the severity of his losses, and the 4th December passed comparatively quietly.

For some days, however, local fighting continued in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie, and his attitude remained aggressive. Local attacks in this sector were repulsed on the 5th December, and on this and the following two days further fierce fighting took place, in which the enemy again endeavoured without success to drive us from our positions on Welsh Ridge.

The strength which the enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks made it evident that only by prolonged and severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right flank on the Bonavis Ridge. Unless this was done, the situation of my troops in the salient north of Flesquieres would be difficult and dangerous, even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended.

I had therefore to decide either to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale, or to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquieres Ridge.

Although this decision involved giving up important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th/5th December the evacuation of the positions held by us north of the Flesquieres Ridge was commenced. On the morning of the 7th December this withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy.

Before withdrawing, the more important of the enemy's field
defences were destroyed, and those of his guns which we had been unable to remove were rendered useless. The enemy did not discover our withdrawal for some time, and when, on the afternoon of the 5th December, he began to feel his way forward, he did so with great caution. In spite of his care, on more than one occasion bodies of his infantry were caught in the open by our artillery.

Much skill and courage were shown by our covering troops in this withdrawal, and an incident which occurred on the afternoon of the 6th December in the neighbourhood of Graincourt deserves special notice.

A covering party, consisting of two companies of the 1/15th Battalion, London Regiment, 47th Division, much reduced in strength by the fighting at Bourlon Wood, found their flank exposed by a hostile attack farther east, and were enveloped and practically cut off. These companies successfully cut their way through to our advanced line of resistance, where they arrived in good order, after having inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.

The new line taken up by us corresponded roughly to the old Hindenburg Reserve Line, and ran from a point about one and a half miles north by east of La Vacquerie, north of Ribecourt and Flesquieres to the Canal du Nord, about one and a half miles north of Havrincourt - i.e., between two and two and a half miles in front of the line held by us prior to the attack of the 20th November.

We therefore retained in our possession an important section of the Hindenburg trench system, with its excellent dug-outs and other advantages.

The Results of the Battle
14. The material results of the three weeks' fighting described above can be stated in general terms very shortly.

We had captured and retained in our possession over 12,000 yards of the former German front tine from La Vacquerie to a point opposite Boursies, together with between 10,000 and 11,000 yards of the Hindenburg Line and Hindenburg Reserve Line and the villages of Ribecourt, Flesquieres and Havrincourt. A total of 145 German guns were taken or destroyed by us in the course of the operations, and 11,100 German prisoners were captured.

On the other hand, the enemy had occupied an unimportant section of our front line between Vendhuille and Gonnetieu. There is little doubt that our operations were of considerable indirect assistance to the Allied forces in Italy. Large demands were made upon the available German reserves at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders.

There is evidence that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two week's at a most critical period, when our Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line.

General Review
15. I have already summarised in the opening paragraphs of this Despatch both the reasons which decided me to undertake the Cambrai operations and the limitations to which those operations were subject.

In view of the strength of the German forces on the front of my attack, and the success with which secrecy was maintained during our preparations, I had calculated that the enemy's prepared defences would be captured in the first rush.

I had good hope that his resisting power behind those defences would then be so enfeebled for a period that we should be able on the same day to establish ourselves quickly and completely on the dominating Bourlon Ridge from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Moeuvres, and to secure our right flank along a line including the Bonavis Ridge, Crevecoeur and Rumilly to Fontaine-notre-Dame.

Even if this did not prove possible within the first twenty-four hours, a second day would be at our disposal before the enemy's reserves could begin to arrive in any formidable
numbers.

Meanwhile, with no wire and no prepared defences to hamper them, it was reasonable to hope that masses of cavalry would find it possible to pass through, whose task would be thoroughly to disorganise the enemy's systems of command and inter-communication in the whole area between the Canal de l'Escaut, the River Sensee and the Canal du Nord, as well as to the east and north-east of Cambrai.

My intentions as regards subsequent exploitation were to push westward and north-westward, taking the Hindenburg Line in reverse from Moeuvres to the River Scarpe, and capturing all the enemy's defences and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a line from Cambrai northwards to the Sensee, and south of that river and the Scarpe.

Time would have been required to enable us to develop and complete the operation; but the prospects of gaining the necessary time, by the use of cavalry in the manner outlined above, were in my opinion good enough to justify the attempt to execute the plan.

I am of opinion that on the 20th and 21st November we went very near to a success sufficiently complete to bring the realisation of our full programme within our power.

The reasons for my decision to continue the fight after the 21st November have already been explained. Though in the event no advantage was gained thereby, I still consider that, as the problem presented itself at the time, the more cautious course would have been difficult to justify.

It must be remembered that it was not a question of remaining where we stood, but of abandoning tactical positions of value, gained with great gallantry, the retention of which seemed not only to be within our power, but likely even yet to lead to further success.

Whatever may be the final decision on this point, as well as on the original decision to undertake the enterprise at all with the forces available, the continuation of our efforts against Fontaine-notre-Dame gave rise to severe fighting, in which our troops more than held their own.

On the 30th November risks were accepted by us at some points in order to increase our strength at others. Our fresh reserves had been thrown in on the Bourlon front, where the enemy brought against us a total force of seven divisions to three and failed. I do not consider that it would have been justifiable on the indications to have allotted a smaller garrison to this front.

Between Masnieres and Vendhuille the enemy's superiority in infantry over our divisions in line was in the proportion of about four to three; and we were sufficiently provided with artillery. That his attack was partially successful may tend to show that the garrison allotted to this front was insufficient, either owing to want of numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion from previous fighting.

Captured maps and orders have made it clear that the enemy aimed at far more considerable results than were actually achieved by him. Three convergent attacks were to be made on the salient formed by our advance; two of them delivered approximately simultaneously about Gonnelieu and Masnieres, followed later by a still more powerful attack on the Bourlon front.

The objectives of these attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault, and the enemy's hope was to capture and destroy the whole of the British forces in the Cambrai salient.

This bold and ambitious plan was foiled on the greater part of our front by the splendid defence of the British divisions engaged; and, though the defence broke down for a time in one area, the recovery made by the weak forces still left and those within immediate reach is worthy of the highest praise. Numberless instances of great gallantry, promptitude and skill were shown, some few of which have been recounted.

I desire to acknowledge the skill and resource displayed by General Byng throughout the Cambrai operations, and to express my appreciation of the manner in which they were conducted by him, as well as by his Staff and the subordinate commanders.

In conclusion, I would point out that the sudden breaking through by our troops of an immense system of defence has had a most inspiring moral effect on the Armies I command, and must have a correspondingly depressing influence upon the enemy.

The great value of the tanks in the offensive has been conclusively proved. In view of this experience, the enemy may well hesitate to deplete any portion of his front, as he did last summer, in order to set free troops to concentrate for decisive action at some other point.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your obedient Servant,
D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France

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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2010 0:06    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 February 1919, Commons Sitting

BRITISH WIVES OF GERMANS.


HC Deb 20 February 1919 vol 112 c1129 1129

63. Major FRED KELLY asked the Prime Minister if it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill allowing a British-born woman married to a German to annul her marriage if she feels she cannot possibly go back to Germany and live with him?

§ Mr. SHORTT I have been asked to answer this question. I fear that I cannot hold out any hope of a Government Bill to the effect suggested.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/feb/20/british-wives-of-germans
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T. E. Lawrence to his family

Military Intelligence Office
Cairo

20.2.15

The Seven Golden Odes of Pagan Arabia or The Moallakat: translated by Lady Anne Blunt, and put into English verse by Wilfred Scawen Blunt: published at the Chiswick Press 5/- in 1904 probably. Can you get me this book? I expect it is out of print:- but if so Blackwell would get a copy very easily, as it is a well known book. If you get it, please send it out to Intelligence Department, W.O. as above. No news this week; we sit still, and maintain an appearance of miserly inactivity. The hotel cost 10/- a day, which is not dear for Cairo... and all of us and all General Maxwell's staff are living here so as to be available by telephone at any time: we have our private wire to the hotel. We have all to stay here and that is why they pay us £400 a year... or a little less, as it seems to work out. I heard from Will, who is consumed with a wild patriotism. I am afraid that I don't feel strongly enough. So far as Syria is concerned it is France and not Turkey that is the enemy... but I wish I could give it to Germany in some way, for the shameless way in which she dragged Turkey into the war. I don't think any nation has ever done in high policies anything quite so [word illegible]. I have written to Mrs. Rieder. Campbell Thompson has gone to the Persian Gulf.

It is no use my sending you news: only I don't think things are going well: it seems to me that attention is fixed on the Belgian front that our interests in the East are being sacrificed. It will go against us very heavily some day.

Could you see if Stanford, (Long Acre) can sell you a map of North Syria, by Blankenhorn: it is about 20 years old, but very good: cost about - 10. - . If you can get a copy, please post it out to me, folded up.

Arnie did not ask me for any postcards I think... tell him to write again. I will be in Egypt some time yet.

N.

http://www.telawrence.net/telawrencenet/letters/1915/150220_family.htm
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Rosa Luxemburg

On 20 February 1914, Luxemburg was sentenced to a year in prison for her antimilitaristic speech at a rally in Freiburg in which she accused German officers of torturing army recruits. Her case became an international affair and the sentence was suspended.

http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Luxemburg_Rosa
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Bess the Mule: a Coalmining Story of 1914
By Bill Kombol, June 11 2008



The following articles, reprinted from 1914 issues of The Seattle Star, relate the story of the underground deaths of two coal miners, Andrew Churnick and Mike Babchanik (or Babcanik). (Actually Mike Babcanik was rather miraculously found alive seven days later.) It is also the story of a mistreated mine mule named Bess. Bess worked 24 hours a day without a rest at a Pacific Coal Co. coal mine in Franklin, in east King County. The revelation of the mule's condition came when a reporter went to the mine to cover the accident. The articles were contributed by William Kombol, Manager of Palmer Coking Coal Company located in Black Diamond (King County), Washington.

Reprinted from The Seattle Star, Thursday, February 19, 1914, p. 8

MULES ARE CHEAP; THEREFORE BESS KEEPS ON TOILING
By Fred L. Boalt

FRANKLIN, Feb. 19 -- There is no room in business for sentimental nonsense.

If you are to show a balance on the right side of the ledger, you cannot be over-careful of the lives of men or the comfort of mules.

Being a practical man, I am led to make these observations after visiting the Cannon mine, here, to find out how Andrew Churnick and Mike Vabcanick, experienced miners, died –– and why.

Viewed sentimentally, the disaster of last Monday was lamentable. One may feel sorry for men and mules that work in mines. But I cannot find that the Pacific Coast Coal Co. was in any way to be blamed for the tragedy.

Its business is to GET OUT THE COAL.

When I reached the mouth of the mine I met Toby, the Slav mule-skinner, and Bess, his mule.
Never have I seen such a ramshackle animal as this rack of bones. Her wobbly legs are swollen and bleeding. Her emaciated body is a mass of harness sores. Her mangy hide, stretched tight as a drumhead, shows every bone. Between bones are deep cavities where flesh ought to be. She had just strength enough left to drag the cars.

“Some Mule,” I observed.

Toby, the tow-headed, regarded his beast without pride.

“Bess he dam’ tired,” he said.

We talked. It seemed Bess was once a fine and prideful mule. Good mules cost money. Mule experts disagree as to which of two policies brings the best returns on an investment in mules.

Some say the better policy is to feed a mule well, and work it reasonable hours, for then it will live long.

But the Pacific Coast Coal Co. has found that mules are tough and hard to kill, and that if you work a mule 24 hours a day, it will, while it lasts, do the work of three mules working eight-hour shifts.

Bess, Toby told me, had worked four months, 24 hour shifts! It’s hard to believe that even a mule could stand it. And on a diet of hay at that!

Toby said Bess snatched ten-minute naps, STANDING UP, between trips!

When Bess dies, the company will buy another mule.

So much for Bess, who isn’t worth bothering about, anyhow.

Men are different. For one thing, men are not property. They work for wages. If they don’t like the job and the attendant risks, they are at liberty to quit.

Clearly, it is the right of a coal company to get out as much coal as possible, as cheaply as possible, and to sell it for as much money as possible.

Therefore, the company, knowing there was coal at the face of No. 11 chute, was justified in telling Andrew Churnick and Mike Babchanik to go there and dig it.

It is true that No. 11 chute was known to be dangerous. For a month the water had been pouring through, and the earth above had been cracking and groaning like a live thing in pain.

It is known, too, that the chute’s face was perilously near the earth’s surface, and that there was gravel, which miners fear as they fear quicksand, ahead.

The company didn’t know that just above the chute was a bog –– a natural catch-basin which drained the hills all about. The company could have known this if it had cared to survey. But surveys cost money.

The flow of water increased until one stream was the size of a man’s arm. The force of the flow over the inclined floor of the chute was sufficient to flush the coal as fast as it was dug down to the gangway, 400 feet away.

This, incidentally, saved the cost of a “bucker,"whose duty it is to “buck” the coal down the incline to where it can be picked up by the cars.

So Churnick and Babchanik approached the chute in fear. But a job’s a job. And $3.80 A DAY WAS ALL THAT STOOD BETWEEN THEIR FAMILIES AND STARVATION.

If you had been on a certain forest trail a mile distant from the mine mouth at 9 o’clock Monday morning, at a point where the road overlooks a natural basin, you could have witnessed what appeared to be a strange and awful phenomenon.

The bottom fell out of the basin. Huge trees tottered and crashed down, and were sucked into the abyss. There was a roar of rushing waters, a crushing, crunching, grinding chorus, and then silence.

At that instant two lives were blotted out in the unseen warren below.

From the still forest trail you could not guess what was happening in the bowels of the earth beneath your feet.

Thousands of tons of water and gravel and boulders and quicksand rushed down into the chute. I think old Earth tried to warn the miners. For this morning the rescue party found the crushed and mangled body of a man, not in No. 11, but in No. 12.

He had run for his life.

The flood caught him and his comrade before they had gotten far, and made short work of them. It swept over them. It roared through the cross-cuts. The miners fled before it, snatching at their heels as they fled from cross-cut to cross-cut, from chute to chute, dodging and twisting in that underground labyrinth, seeking an avenue of escape.

Only the bulkheads at the bottom of the chutes held the flood out of the gangway long enough for the miners to get away.

No coal is coming out of the mine today. Only gravel and muck.

But, coal or muck, there is no rest for Bess.

“Hard luck,” said Superintendent of Mines, William Hann.

“It is not my business to fix the responsibility,” said State Mine Inspector, James Bagley.

“If,” said an old miner, “the company had obeyed the law and made test borings, the water and gravel would have been discovered, and Mike and Andy would be alive today.”

The state will pay the widows $4,000 each and wash its hands of the whole business.

The company may do something handsome in the way of funeral expenses.

The Seattle Star, Friday, February 20, 1914, p. 1

County Humane Society to Aid Bess, the Mule

The King County Humane society promises to put an end to the practice of the Pacific Coast Coal Co., which has found that by working mules in its mines continually without a rest until they die, more work can be accomplished than by working the animals in shifts.

Fred L. Boalt, special writer for The Star, found such a condition upon arriving in Franklin, Wash., to “cover” an accident in the Cannon coal mine.

The story appeared in Thursday’s Star; and, acting immediately, the humane society assigned Officer Vaupel and Mrs. S. A. Hollabaugh to investigate.

The Seattle Star, Wednesday, February 25, 1914, p. 1

HUMANE AGENT RESCUES BESS; TO MAKE ARREST

“Bess,” the mule which worked 24 hours a day in the Pacific Coast Coal Co.’s mine at Franklin, Wash., is enjoying a much-needed rest today as a result of prompt action by the King County Humane society, following publication of an article regarding her in The Star.

An arrest will be made at the mine today, as a consequence.

Fred L. Boalt, The Star’s special writer discovered “Bess” while “covering” a mine accident at Franklin. He found that the company worked its mules until they die; instead of getting more and working them in shifts. It was cheaper.

Mrs. S. C. Griggs, secretary of the Humane society, visited the mine with two officers Friday. She immediately ordered Bess to the barn.

“The mule had worked two weeks without a rest,” Mrs. Griggs said.

Postscript:

On St. Patrick’s Day, 1914, the Pacific Coast Coal Company hired the famed photographer Asahel Curtis, who had teamed up with William Miller in the firm Curtis and Miller, to take three photos of “Bess” the mule. The photos were shot in the town of Franklin not far from the mine. They were likely taken in order to dispel any remaining public concerns as to the ultimate fate of “Bess.”

Poem

(Reprinted from The Seattle Star, March 21, 1914, p. 4)

THE MULE
by Berton Braley

You couldn't call the mule "a beaut,"
However much you boast of him.
For pulchritude is not his suit,
To say the very most of him;
His disposition, too, is not especially commendable.
And, though he'll often stand a lot,
His temper's undependable.

He's hard of mouth and obstinate;
Acquaintance soon reveals of him,
That it is sometimes tempting fate,
To get too near the heels of him;
And when he lays those long ears back,
No beating or reproving him,
Will ever stir him from his track,
Until the spirit's moving him.

And yet -- and yet the mule will thrive,
And labor with agility,
Where horses cannot keep alive,
But die with great facility;
His treatment frequently is rough,
But he is quite resigned to it,
And he can toil with vim enough,
When he makes up his mind to it!

Not always is a heavy stick,
The most effective charm to him,
For, though his muleship's hide is thick,
Good usage does no harm to him;
So look on him with kindly eye,
And you will not repent of it;
His market price is very high,
And he's worth every cent of it!


Historical Note

Concerning the character of a mule (from a post card from a Wallace, Idaho, mining museum):

"Being a dependable, intelligent and hard working animal the mule was particularly well suited to hauling in the mine. They quickly learned the haulage level and their job, making reins unnecessary. These hardy animals sometimes stayed underground for up to eight years. They have now been replaced by battery powered locomotives sometimes referred to as 'Electric Mules.'"

http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=8651
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Theo van Doesburg: "Uwe liefde...", 20 februari 1915



Lees verder op http://nl.wikisource.org/wiki/Theo_van_Doesburg/Uwe_liefde
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Saxe-Altenburg Bravery Medal (Tapferkeitsmedaille), 1918-1919



Established by Duke Ernst II on 20 February 1915. Originally made in bronze, in 1918 shortages caused the medal to be issued in grey zinc. It was small Dutch and only about 2,300 medals in zinc were made.

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=6acc8cc1a4594c25e071f80f22e2207f&p=70720392
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Soldier Outside Tents at Royal Park Army Camp, Parkville, 1915



Black and white photograph showing a soldier in front of a row of tents at the Army Camp at Royal Park, during World War I, circa 1915. This soldier is thought to be Private Archibald Campbell of the 23rd Battalion AIF, B Company. He enlisted on 20 February 1915, left Melbourne on the Euripides on 8 May 1915, and fought in Gallipoli before going to the front in France. He was killed in France in August 1916.

http://museumvictoria.com.au/collections/items/1689777/digital-photograph-soldier-outside-tents-at-royal-park-army-camp-parkville-1915
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New Zealand Pioneer Battalion badge



In 1914 Two Maori Companies were formed, A Company from North Auckland, West Coast North Island and South Island; B Company from the Centre and East Coast of the North Island. They left New Zealand called the Maori Contingent, though their formal name was the New Zealand Native Contingent, in February 1915 and took part in the Gallipoli Campaign from July 1915.

After Gallipoli the Contingent was split up for a brief period with the men being posted to Territorial units but this was found to be unacceptable and the Unit was reformed as the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion on 20 February 1916 and served in France. Initially the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion had two Maori Companies but from September 1917 became an all-Maori unit and was renamed as the New Zealand (Maori) Pioneer Battalion. The battalion was finally disbanded in March 1919.

These changes were reflected in the regimental badges, and the example shown here is the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion badge as worn from February 1916 to September 1917. The original badge and the final badge both incorporated the motto Te Hoko Whitu a Tu (The twice seventy (140) warriors of Tumatauenga, God of War).

http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/881/new-zealand-pioneer-battalion-badge
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Prisoner Drowns Trying to Flee Alcatraz in Fog.
Companion Has Narrow Escape as Log He Rides is Caught in Swirling Tide-Rip
.
Source: San Francisco Examiner, 20 February 1916, page 12.

One prisoner is believed to have lost his life and another narrowly escaped drowning while attempting to escape from the military prison at Alcatraz island in the heavy tule fog which shrouded the bay early yesterday morning.

The man believed to have been drowned is Claude Eley, a private who was serving a short sentence for infraction of military rules. The name of the other man the officers on the island refused to divulge. He was captured.

According to the story given out each man obtained a pile and started to float to the mainland from the west side of Alcatraz. The logs and their human burdens were caught in the ripping swirl between the main island and Little Alcatraz, a rock about two hundred yards from the large island and both decided to leave the piles and swim for the rock. Eley was unable to make it and sank while the cries of his companion attracted the attention of guards and he was rescued.

The launch Alcatraz patrolled the bay between and the island and the mainland but no trace of Eley was found.

http://www.sfgenealogy.com/sf/history/sfoealc2.htm#n18
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Te Hokowhitu a Tu


Deputy Prime Minister Joseph Ward visited
the Pioneer Battalion troops in France in 1918.


A Maori Battalion was raised and sailed from New Zealand on the 14 February 1915. They were known as Te Hokowhitu a Tu. Some doubts were held about the men's fighting ability and they had fewer numbers than a full infantry battalion, so they were designated as a pioneer battalion when they arrived in Egypt.

They landed at Anzac Cove on 3 July 1915 and soon proved their worth both as hard working and cunning engineers, as well as doughty fighters. They were soon committed to the fighting as a contingent and from a strength of 476 officers and men were reduced to 60 by August when they were rested on the Greek island of Lemnos.

On 20 February 1916, the remnants of the original Maori Contingent was combined with with Maori reinforcements and men of the Otago Mounted Rifles, plus 125 Niue Islanders and 45 Rarotongan, to form The New Zealand Pioneer Battalion.

The Pioneer Battalion reached France on 9 April 1916 and served on the Western Front for the rest of the war. They were an engineering force consisting of two Maori companies and two pakeha companies. The purpose of the battalion was to build roads, erect barbed wire entanglements and dig trenches, from which derived the name 'Diggers'. They also took part in raids and battles.

They were the only New Zealand battalion to return home as a complete unit, and when they reached New Zealand in March 1919 they received a rapturous welcome at cities, towns and maraes.

2,227 Maori and 458 Pacific Islanders served with the Pioneer Battalion.
336 died on active duty and 734 were wounded.


Pacific Island members of the NZ Pioneer Battalion performing in France.

Te Ope Tuatahi

This was the recruiting song of the First Maori Contingent in World War One. They served in Egypt, Gallipoli, France and Belgium.

Te ope tuatahi
No Aotearoa
No Te Wai-pounamu;
No nga tai e wha.

Ko koutou ena
E nga rau e rima,
Te Hokowhitu toa
A Tu-matau-enga:

I hinga ka Ihipa,
Ki Karipori ra ia.
E ngau nei te aroha,
Me te mamae.

Te ope tuarua,
No Mahaki rawa,
Na Hauiti koe,
Na Porourangi:

I haere ai Hënare
Me tö wiwi,
I patu ki te pakanga,
Ki Para-nihi ra ia.

Ko wai he morehu
Hei kawe korero
Ki te iwi nui e,
E taukuri nei?

Te ope tua-iwa
No Te Arawa,
No Te Tai-rawhiti,
No Kahungunu.

E haere ana au
Ki runga o Wiwi
Ki reira au nei,
E tangi ai.

Me mihi kau atu
I te nuku o te whenua,
He konei ra e,
E te tau pumau.


Translation:

The first contingent was
from throughout New Zealand,
including the South Island;
they were from the four tides.

You there
the five hundred
the brave Battalion
of angry-eyed Tu.

Some of you have fallen in Egypt,
some in Gallipoli.
Love gnaws within us
and pain also.

The second echelon was
from around Gisborne,
from Tolaga Bay,
from the East Coast.

Farewell, O Henare, 1
and your 'clump of rushes' 2
who fell while fighting
in France.

Who will survive there
to bring the story back
to all the people
in sorrow bowed?

The ninth contingent
is from near Rotorua,
from near Gisborne,
and from Hawkes Bay.

And now I am going
to the conflict of the Frenchmen 3
and there will I
weep.

I salute you as I disappear 4
out of sight of the land.
Goodbye
my own true love.


Notes
1 - 2nd-Lieut Henare Mokena Kohere, died of wounds after a night raid on the Somme, Sept 1916.
2 - wiwi - Wiwi are clumps of rushes. There is a story of Te Rauparaha getting his warriors to wrap their cloaks around wiwi at a distance from an enemy pa before a dawn attack, to deceive the pa's guards.
3 - Wiwi - Frenchmen. When the Maoris went to France, they heard the French saying "Oui! Oui!" Yes! Yes! all the time.
4 - Kau atu has been translated as in vain, or remembering. But kau mai means to slowly come into sight, like a boat over the horizon, so kau atu must be the opposite, slowly fade away
.

http://folksong.org.nz/te_ope_tuatahi/index.html
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The Lancashire Daily Post, Tuesday, 20 February 1917

CHECK ON TIGRIS.
____________

ASSAULT ON THE SANNA-I-YAT POSITION.
____________

TRENCHES WON AND LOST.
____________

FURTHER PROGRESS WEST OF THE SHUMRUM BEND.
___________

The British have made some further progress in enveloping on the south bank the second bend of the Tigris west of Kut. Fifteen miles east of Kut an attack on Saturday found the Turks still holding strongly the Sanna-i-Yat position, which for a year has blocked advance on the north bank. The position was penetrated on two small frontages and the ground afterwards lost to counter-attacks.
The Secretary of the War Office last night issued the following:-
On the afternoon of February 17th (Saturday) an assault was made on the Sanna-i-Yat
position on the left (north) bank of the Tigris, and the enemy's two front lines were occupied on a frontage of 350 and 540 yards respectively.
Two heavy Turkish counter-attacks were launched, the first one hour and the second one and a half hours after we had obtained possession of these trenches. The former was repulsed, but the letter was partially successful and forced our right back to the original line. Our left, however, held on till dark, when it was withdrawn under cover of an artillery barrage.
On the south bank of the Tigris, west of the Shumran bend, further progress has been made.

TURKS’ REPORT.

The following official report was issued in Constantinople yesterday :--
Tigris Front.—On February 17th (Saturday), after an intense artillery preparation, the enemy attacked our Fellahie position with a force of the strength at least of an infantry
brigade. The enemy succeeded temporarily in penetrating our positions, but was driven out again by means of bayonet charges and attacks with hand grenades, so that eventually we reoccupied our positions entirely. We made prisoners one officer and 60 men, and captured a machine gun and some automatic rifles, Our loses were quite insignificant.
Note.—What the Turks call the Fellahie position is what the British call the Sanna-i-Yat position, 15 miles east of Kut, between the river and a big swamp.)
The attack described above represents an attempt to carry the northern section of the now famous Sanna-i-Yat position, which with the Es Sinn position last year successfully arrested General Gorringe's march to the relief of Kut. General Gorringe secured the southern section of Sanna-i-Yat, but could not follow up his success, and General Maude turned the southern section of Es Sinn when the present phase of the campaign began. Sanna-i-Yat is fifteen miles east of Kut and Es Sinn midway between to two places.
The Turk position on the north bank is an extraordinary one. The enemy face us from across the river on it front of 22 miles, or nearly double that taking into account the convolutions of the river, and hold at the extreme easterly end the Sanna-i-Yat defences, which are at right angles with the river, and which can be taken in the rear by our artillery fire. A crossing of the river, if possible, would turn the whole position,
M. Marcel Hutin, writing to the "Echo de Paris" says, Where British tenacity is showing self in accordance with national tradition is towards Kut-el-Amara, where the Turkish position has been literally broken in on the southern bank of the Tigris. I would not be surprised if we shortly hear of the surrender of the Ottoman and German troops who have not been able to escape the net in which they have been more and more enmeshed by the British forces. Such a victory would have an extraordinary importance throughout the whole of Asia Minor.

BATTLE FOR BAGDAD
_____________

GERMAN CRITIC PREDICTS A GREAT STRUGGLE

ZURICH (Received To-Day).

The military critic of the “Frankfurter Zeitung” predicts that the coming spring will witness a great struggle in Mesopotamia.

“It is easy to foresee,” he says, “that an important offensive movement in the direction of Bagdad is coming in the near future. Kut-el-Amara is already seriously menaced by the British, although the place is still in Turkish hands. The British have constructed behind their lines a railway to facilitate their operations. They have gathered reinforcements, and they are attempting to develop prudently the tactical successes recently gained by them in the sector of the sixth Turkish army. The great battle for Bagdad is the logical consequence of the British military policy. – Central New.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=115080
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:19    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Stijn Streuvels, In oorlogstijd. Het volledige dagboek van de Eerste Wereldoorlog

20 februari 1917 - De Uhlanen zijn ineens vertrokken zonder dat iemand weet hoe of wat of door wie de bewakingsdienst nu zal uitgevoerd worden. Intussen halen de mensen wat asem en maken er gebruik van om uit te zetten waar 't nood doet of de begeerte hen aanzet.

http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/stre009inoo02_01/stre009inoo02_01_0030.php
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:21    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Letter from Ernest Jones to Sigmund Freud, February 20, 1917

20 February 1917
69 Portland Court, London

Dear Professor,

I have been hoping to hear from you, and trust you are well. I think of you when reading the accounts of tobacco shortage, and hope you have a good stock of cigars laid in.

Since my last letter, written about Christmas time, I have the news to give that I got married last week, and have just returned from a week's honeymoon in West Cornwall—the Celtic end of England. She is Welsh, young (23), very pretty, intelligent, and musical.1 After taking her degree in music she studied for four years at the Academy and sang at her first and last public concert the week I captured her; she has also composed some promising works. I feel it is a normal choice and we are exceedingly happy. You shall see her as soon as the war is over, which should be this year according to all opinion here (except my own). (...)

http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=zbk.028.0322a
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:23    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 44, 20 February 1917





http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=d&d=EP19170220.2.41.9
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:27    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Mijnkrater 7/6/1917 Kruisstraat 2



De eerste ‘volwaardige’ ondergrondse mijnen werden in de Ieperboog wellicht door de Duitsers tot ontploffing gebracht eind januari 1915 tussen de weg Menen-Ieper en Sint-Elooi. Hiermee was de aanzet gegeven voor een mijnenoorlog, die de volgende jaren de ondergrond van de Ieper- en Wijtschaeteboog heel regelmatig omwoelde en dood en vernieling zaaide, met als ‘climax’ de Mijnenslag van 7 juni 1917.

Sinds de Tweede Slag om Ieper (voorjaar 1915) was de frontlinie vrij stabiel gebleven, waarbij de Duitsers ‘vrij comfortabel’ vanuit de hoger gelegen posities de geallieerden domineerden en in het oog konden houden. Een strategisch voordeel van jewelste, dat de Britten in hun voordeel trachtten om te buigen…

Stuwkracht achter de idee om de vijand op grote diepte te ondergraven, was de vrij excentrieke Brit Norton Griffiths. De eerste graafwerkzaamheden startten in de zomer van 1915 bij Hill 60, met het uitgraven van de zogenaamde ‘Berlin Tunnel’ door de ‘175th Tunnelling Company’. Zonder dat hij weet had van de plannen van Griffith, zou ook Major Cropper van de ‘250th Tunnelling Company’ in december 1915 gestart zijn met graafwerkzaamheden voor dieptemijnen rond Wijtschate. Ondertussen werden deze ideeën overgenomen door de legerstaf en geïntegreerd in de plannen om een doorbraak rond Ieper te forceren. Uiteindelijk zouden er op 7 juni 1917 tussen Hill 60 en ‘The Birdcage’ (ten Z van Warneton) 19 dieptemijnen tot ontploffing gebracht worden. Britten, Australiërs en Nieuw-Zeelanders slaagden er in de heuvelkam Wijtschate-Mesen te veroveren. Maar de geallieerden maakten geen gebruik van de bres die ontstaan was, en wachtten zoals gepland af tot eind juli om aan hun groots offensief te beginnen (Derde Slag om Ieper).

In december 1915 startte de ‘250th Tunnelling Company’ met de graafwerkzaamheden, die vervolgens door de ‘182nd Tunnelling Company’, de ‘3rd Canadian Tunnelling Company’, de ‘175th Tunnelling Company’ en de ‘171st Tunnelling Company’ werden opgevolgd. De werkzaamheden vlotten vrij snel (ondanks Duitse gasaanvallen) en op 12 juni 1916 konden de eerste 2 mijnladingen geplaatst worden. Vervolgens werd werk gemaakt van een derde mijnlading, die eind augustus 1916 geplaatst kon worden. De galerij was 660m lang geworden. Ondertussen zaten de Duitsers niet stil. Zo slaagden ze erin om vanuit hun ‘Ferdinand’-systeem op 19 en 20 februari 1917, over een afstand van 70m, 3 ladingen tot ontploffing te brengen, waardoor de springkamer van lading 1 onder water liep en de ‘tunnellers’ genoodzaakt werden om een bijkomende ruimte uit te graven, waar een 4de lading werd geplaatst. Op 9 mei 1917 waren de 4 mijnen, met in het totaal 50000kg explosieven, in gereedheid gebracht. Ze veroorzaakten op 7 juni 3 kraters, de eerste krater (veroorzaakt door de 1ste en 4de lading) had een diameter van 71,6m en een diepte van 10,4m, de tweede een diameter van 66,1m en een diepte van 12,2m en de derde een diameter van 61,6m en diepte van 9,1m. Eén krater werd in september 1972 dichtgegooid.

http://inventaris.vioe.be/woi/relict/2106
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:32    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles - CEF WAR DIARIES 1914 -1919

February 1917 - 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion, 3rd Canadian Division



http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e046/e001126011.jpg via http://www.webarts.org.uk/2CMR/wdFeb1917.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:33    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Vera Brittain letter to Edward Brittain (20th February, 1917)

You and I are not only aesthetic but ascetic - at any rate in regard to sex. Or perhaps, since "ascetic" implies rather a lack of emotion, it would be more correct to say exclusive - Geoffrey is very much this, and Victor, and Roland was. What I mean by this is, that so many people are attracted by the opposite sex simply because it is the opposite sex - the average officer and the average "nice girl" demand, I am sure, little but this. But where you and I are concerned, sex by itself doesn't interest us unless it is united with brains and personality; in fact we rather think of the latter first, and the person's sex afterwards... I think very probably that older women will appeal to you much more than younger ones, as they do me. This means that you will probably have to wait a good many years before you find anyone you could wish to marry, but I don't think this need worry you, for there is plenty of time, and very often people who wait get something well worth waiting for.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWbrittainE.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:37    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Failed Designs: Blackburn Triplane



The Blackburn Triplane was a single-engine pusher single-seater, designed specifically to attack Zeppelins. It flew in 1917, but was not successful.

The Triplane was the third unsuccessful attempt at an anti-Zeppelin fighter that involved Blackburn. The first was Blackburn's own Twin Blackburn and the second the AD Scout, Blackburn building two of the four machines of this type to an Air Department of the Admiralty design. In 1916, the Scout's designer, Harris Booth moved to Blackburn where he created a heavily-revised aircraft, the Triplane.
[Read more]

The layout of both Scout and Triplane was determined largely by the Admiralty requirement to carry a quick-firing, recoilless Davis gun that used 2 lb (1 kg) shells. At the time, there was no way of synchronising such a weapon with the propeller, or of mounting it elsewhere than the fuselage, so a pusher configuration was necessary, the pilot sitting in a nacelle with the gun in its nose.

In order to make the aircraft more manoeuvrable and in particular to increase its roll rate, a triplane configuration was chosen. This provided about the same total wing area as that of the biplane Scout with a lower moment of inertia about the roll axis. The Triplane had single-bay wings with heavy stagger and carrying six ailerons. The lower wing was close to the ground so two underwing skids were added below the interplane struts. The mid-line of the nacelle, with the engine at its rear, was on the centre plane, giving the pilot a slightly less good view than from the Scout.

Four parallel tail booms ran aft, two from the mid-span of the upper wing and the others from the lower wing. These four members carried the tail. The tailplane, mounted on the upper booms and bearing a full-width elevator, had a span of 18 ft 10 in (5.74 m), no less than 78% of the wingspan. A pair of fin and rudders joined the upper and lower booms, a height of about 7 ft 6 in (2.3 m). The "reversed" undercarriage of the Scout was abandoned and the main wheels were mounted on a single axle supported by two pairs of struts to the nacelle. Though photographs show the gun port, the gun itself was probably never fitted.

The Triplane first flew with a 110 hp (80 kW) Clerget rotary engine driving a four-blade, 8 ft (2.46 m) diameter airscrew, then later with a 100 hp (75 kW) Gnome with a two-blade propeller.

Only one was built. It was accepted by the Admiralty on 20 February 1917, but was rapidly found wanting like the Scout before it. It was struck off charge just a month later, the only Blackburn triplane and the last of their attempts to build an anti-Zeppelin fighter.

http://www.wwiaviation.com/failures.html
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:52    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 mark bill from the days of the German depression (Back), 20 February 1918



http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20_Mark_Berlin_1918_02.jpg
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BerichtGeplaatst: 19 Feb 2011 15:54    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

V. I. Lenin: "Speech to the Lettish Riflemen", February 20, 1918
Published: Novaya Zhizn No. 30, February 21 (8), 1918

Lenin made a long speech in which he called on the Letts to support Soviet power on the question of peace. The worn-out Russian people had to be given peace at all costs. In doing so we would strengthen the revolution and start building a new young Russia. In any case, the surrendered territories would not remain occupied, because the Russian revolution in the near future would spread not only to Germany, but to the other belligerent powers. The impact of the world social revolution would compel German imperialism to give up all its conquests.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/feb/20.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2011 15:37    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Two bandits rob a Great Northern train near Bellingham and kill three passengers on February 20, 1914.



On Friday evening, February 20, 1914, two armed bandits board a northbound Great Northern passenger train at Burlington, Washington to rob the passengers traveling in the day-coach. Three passengers attempt to disarm one of the bandits and a wrestling match ensues. After killing the three men, the bandits calmly proceed to rob the other passengers. A conductor sitting in the dining car, hears the shooting, and pulls the cord for the emergency brakes. As the train comes to a halt near the Samish Depot, the bandits jump off and escape into the darkness. Authorities in Washington and British Columbia arrest and question scores of ex-convicts and suspicious transients, but none are charged with the crime. Although the Great Northern Railway offers a $30,000 reward for the capture of the bandits, dead or alive, the crime remains unsolved.

Two Well-Dressed Bandits

On Friday at 4:35 p.m., February 20, 1914, Great Northern passenger train No. 358 left the Seattle’s King Street Station en route to Vancouver, B.C., Canada. The train stopped at Burlington in Skagit County at 7:00 p.m. to discharge and receive passengers. Two men, dressed conservatively in suits, hats, and overcoats, boarded the smoking/observation car and sat down. At about 7:15 p.m. the train departed the station for Bellingham.

The train picked up speed as it proceeded across the Skagit Valley toward Blanchard. At about 7:30 p.m., the two men stepped into the vestibule between the smoking car and the day-coach and tied large white handkerchiefs over their faces. The first bandit stepped through the rear door into the coach, shouting “hands up” and shot out a light in the ceiling of the car. The second bandit ran up the isle to the front door and locked it, preventing anyone from entering from the dining car.

Three men were sitting in the seats near the front door: Thomas F. Wadsworth, a Canadian Pacific Railway conductor; Harold. R. Adkison, a salesman for Vancouver Tire and Rubber Company; and Robert L. Lee, a clerk for the Puget Sound Navy Yard in Bremerton. Wadsworth immediately attacked the bandit, trying to take away his gun. Then Adkison and Lee joined the fight. While they were struggling, the bandit at the rear of the car walked down the isle shooting out the coach’s ceiling lights and then shot Wadsworth in the shoulder. The bullet traveled through his body into his heart. The second bandit managed to shoot Adkison point blank through the left eye. The bullet entered his brain. Then he shot Lee five times in the back. One bullet penetrated his heart.

The first bandit returned to the rear of the car, telling the hysterical passengers not to be afraid, it was all a joke, then demanding their money and valuables. Some of the passengers hid their personal property, but many threw their purses and wallets into the aisle. The second bandit started walking down the aisle, collecting the loot.

The Killers Escape

Conductor Charles S. Waldren was sitting in the dining car when he heard gunshots and pulled the cord for the emergency brakes. The bandits were gathering and stuffing the spammer into their coat pockets when the train came to an abrupt halt near the Samish interurban station, about 10 miles south of Bellingham. They immediately ran from the coach into the front vestibule and leaped from the platform, escaping into the darkness. The passengers estimated their losses at about $100.

Four people waiting at the Samish interurban station saw two men leap from the day-coach and run along the right side of the train to the engine tender. As the men started to climb onto the tender, they were scared away by the approach of the engineer George C. Wright shining a flashlight back along the train. The men ducked under the train, ran 40 feet and disappeared under the wooden platform in front of the Pearl Oyster Company, hiding there until the train left for Bellingham.

Learning that the bandits had escaped, the conductor had the engineer take the train into Bellingham where it was met by the Whatcom County Coroner Dr. Henry Thompson, and three deputy sheriffs at the Great Northern Station. Dr. Thompson took charge of the scene, examining the bodies where they fell and taking names and addresses of the witnesses. The bodies of the three murdered men were removed to the Anders G. Wickman Undertaking Parlor at 1146 Elk Street (now State Street) in Bellingham.

The Manhunt Begins

Whatcom County Sheriff Lewis A. Thomas and Skagit County Sheriff Edwin Wells combined forces to search for the bandits. Heavily armed posses were sent to patrol all the trails, roads, intersections, and train tracks between Burlington and Bellingham. A sheriff’s posse was sent south on a special train toward Samish to examine the crime scene and search for the killers. Using lanterns, they found tracks that led from a culvert under the Pearl Oyster Company wharf, north along the Samish Bay tideflats toward Chuckanut Bay, where the bandits could have stashed a boat. Police officers were sent from Bellingham in fast motor launches to patrol the area as it was realized that the men could easily make their escape by water to the San Juan Islands or Canada. The manhunt continued throughout the night without success.

On Saturday, February 21, 1914, law enforcement authorities established a dragnet covering Western Washington and British Columbia. Scores of transients and ex-convicts were detained and questioned by police. Armed men stopped all vehicles and trains traveling through the area, looking for suspicious persons. Posses began combing the woods for miles around Samish and a pack of bloodhounds from the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe was brought in for the hunt.

Bellingham Police Officers combed the entire shoreline from Blanchard to Bellingham, inspecting shacks and hobo camps, looking for hiding places and clues. They learned from a fisherman living in the vicinity that a strange motorboat put into Chuckanut Bay about 8:00 p.m. the previous night and was gone in the morning. The authorities, convinced that the bandits had made their escape by boat, abandoned the land search and increased the number of motor launches searching the San Juan Islands and patrolling the waters south of the international boundary.

Train Robbery No. 2

By coincidence, on Saturday night, Puget Sound Electric Company interurban train No. 59, southbound to Tacoma, was held up at the South Side Station, six miles from Seattle, by three masked men brandishing handguns. While one bandit held his gun on the train crew, the other bandits forced 18-year-old Norris King to carry his hat through the forward coach, collecting money from the passengers. After that, they robbed the passengers in the rear coach and the train crew.

These bandits escaped with an estimated $400 in loot. The newspapers speculated the robberies of interurban and the Great Northern passenger train were connected somehow, but law enforcement authorities quickly dispelled that theory. Sheriff’s posses searched South King County for two days but the interurban bandits were never caught.

The Great Northern's Maximum Effort

James J. Hill (1838-1916), owner of the Great Northern Railway, sent Chief Special Agent Al G. Ray from headquarters in Saint Paul, Minnesota, and Assistant Special Agents James J. Davis from Seattle, Charles McShane from Chicago, and James A. Dundon from Columbus, Ohio, to Bellingham to direct the investigation. Hill’s instructions were to spare no expense and to stop at nothing to capture the two fugitives. He dispatched 150 railroad detectives and Pinkerton Agents to the Northwest to participate in the manhunt and to follow leads. Chief Ray established his center of operations in Bellingham's Leopold Hotel, 1218 Dock Street (now 1224 Cornwall Avenue) on Sunday, February 22, 1914, announcing that a detective would be there at all times to receive information. The Great Northern Railway distributed thousands of handbills offering a $30,000 reward for the capture of the killers, dead or alive.

On Tuesday, February 24, 1914, the intensive manhunt for the two bandits was abandoned. All the suspects arrested in connection with the crime had been questioned and released. Over the next several days, armed vigilantes continued roaming the area hoping to capture the killers and collect the reward money. The agents stationed at the Leopold Hotel were fielding at least 20 telephone calls per day from all over the Northwest with information about suspicious persons and activities. Most of the Great Northern Railway detectives working in the area were dispatched to follow clues in other parts of Washington and British Columbia, leaving the county sheriffs to pursue the local leads. Every penal institution in the Northwest sent photographs of recently released convicts to Special Agent Davis at the Leopold Hotel. The pictures were shown to witnesses, but none were identified as the bandits. The investigation dragged on without success.

On Friday, March 20, 1914, Chief Special Agent Ray announced they would be leaving Bellingham to attend to their regular duties, but an agent would remain at the Leopold Hotel for a few weeks to investigate any new leads. He said that railroad detectives had two suspects under surveillance in Canada and were in the process of collecting corroborating evidence. An informant in a Victoria B.C. hospital, believing he was about to die from an abdominal gunshot wound, identified the train robbers as George Ball and Harry Mathews, both ex-convicts and drug addicts. Chief Ray said that witnesses to the robbery had tentatively identified mug-shots of George E. Ball, age 25, and Harry Mathews, age 26, as the bandits.

Chief Special Agent Ray alleged that on Wednesday, February 18, 1914, Ball and Mathews purchased two guns from a pawn shop in Seattle, then traveled to Bellingham by train on Thursday, February 19, 1914. They visited two local drug stores and made purchases of pharmaceutical-grade morphine. Later, they hung around a billiard hall and played several games of pool. The druggists and billiard hall proprietor picked mug-shots of Ball and Mathews from 50 pictures of ex-convicts. On Friday, February 20, 1914, the day of the robbery, Ball and Mathews took the Pacific Northwest Traction Company interurban train to Mount Vernon where they purchased morphine, ate ice cream and drank several glasses of Coca-Cola in local drug stores. They walked three miles to Burlington in the late afternoon and boarded Great Northern passenger train No. 358, murdered three men and robbed the passengers in the day-coach. After leaving the train, the men split up. Ball reached Bellingham, riding on the brake beams of the train he had just robbed, and Mathews dropped out of sight.

The Case of George Ball

Coincidentally, a railroad detective from Seattle claimed he recognized George Ball on the streets of Bellingham the morning after the robbery. When Ball boarded the northbound Great Northern passenger train for Canada, the detective followed. They both left the train at New Westminster, B.C. where they took jobs in a logging camp. Six more railroad detectives joined in the surveillance, hoping that Ball would join with Mathews. Over the next few weeks, they shadowed Ball around lower British Columbia then to Calgary, Alberta. When news leaked out that warrants had been issued for the arrest of the men suspected of the train robbery, Ball began to act suspiciously and the detectives feared that surveillance was blown. On Thursday night, March 26, 1914, Ball was arrested by the Calgary Police as he exited a telegraph office. The railroad detectives speculated that Ball, spotting the surveillance, telegraphed Mathews to warn him away.

On Saturday, March 28, 1914, two Great Northern Railway detectives arrived in Vancouver B.C. on the Canadian Pacific Railway with prisoner George Ball. There they met with Sheriff Edwin Wells, who had an arrest warrant for Ball issued by Skagit County Superior Court Judge Egbert Crookston. Ball denied any connection with the crime, then waived extradition to the United States, declaring he had an alibi for the day of the train robbery.

On Wednesday, April 1, 1914, Chief Prosecutor Charles D. Beagle charged George E. Ball in Skagit County Superior Court with train robbery and the first-degree murder of three passengers. But Prosecutor Beagle and Sheriff Wells were not satisfied they had charged the right man and made two trips to British Columbia to investigate Ball’s alibi. They returned to Mount Vernon convinced that the railroad detectives had arrested the wrong man. Even when the detective’s mistakes were pointed out, Great Northern Railway officials persisted in pushing the case against Ball. Beagle paid to bring three witnesses from Port Coquitlam, B.C. to Mount Vernon to testify on Ball’s behalf.

On Friday, April 10, 1914, Ball entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment before Judge Crookston. At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution produced several witnesses who thought they recognized Ball as one of the bandits, but none would swear to it. Ball said it was a case of mistaken identity. He identified a picture of Mathews as Harry McAvoy, a man he had met several months ago in Vancouver, B.C., but hadn’t seen since. Ball testified that he was in Port Coquitlam with friends on February 20, 1914, the day of the robbery, and defense attorney John F. Dore introduced Beagle’s three witnesses to establish his alibi. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Crookston bound the case over for trial in Superior Court.

The Wrong Man?

To further confuse matters, on April 18, 1914, Prosecutor Beagle arrested L. P. Johnson, one of the state’s most important identification witnesses, for first-degree perjury. Johnson had testified at the preliminary hearing that he knew Ball and saw him drinking at the Pioneer Saloon in Sedro Woolley on February 21, 1914, the day after the robbery. However the saloon’s liquor license had expired and was closed from February 15 to February 24, 1914, and on that day, Ball was registered at a hotel in Kamloops, B.C. Johnson pleaded not guilty and his trial was set for June 15, 1914.

Conflict with the Great Northern Railway officials over prosecuting Ball led Beagle to request that Washington State Attorney General William V. Tanner conduct an independent investigation of Ball’s alibi. Beagle gave Tanner a complete report detailing Ball’s movements from one week before to three weeks after the crime, including names, addresses, interviews and a hotel register proving he was in Canada on the day of the robbery. He also learned that the informant in Victoria, B.C. who had originally fingered Ball as one of the bandits did it out of spite over a woman.

Beagle told Tanner he was concerned about a possible conspiracy by railroad detectives to frame Ball for the crime in order to collect the $30,000 reward. Assistant Attorney General Scott Z. Henderson engaged the Burns Detective Agency to investigate the case. A few weeks later, they reported that Beagle’s report was accurate. Ball’s alibi was valid.

On Monday, June 15, 1914, the case against George E. Ball was dismissed in Skagit County by Superior Court Judge Jessie P. Houser on a motion by Prosecuting Attorney Beagle, who said the state’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The motion was unopposed by Frederick V. Brown, counsel for the Great Northern Railway. Judge Houser ordered that Ball be held in the Mount Vernon jail as a material witness until the completion of L. P. Johnson’s trial for first degree perjury, which began the same day. The trial concluded at 4:00 p.m. on June 17, 1914. After deliberating for about two hours, the jury acquitted Johnson of the charge and both he and Ball were released from custody.

Harry Mathews

Great Northern Railway investigators fared no better in their search for Ball’s alleged partner, Harry Mathews. Shortly after the robbery, Seattle Police arrested an ex-convict named Harry Mathews, but after interrogation by Captain Charles Tennant, he was released. On March 28, 1914, Special Agent Davis located Mathews in the Western Washington State Hospital at Steilacoom. The Seattle District Court had committed him to the mental institution 10 days earlier upon complaint of his father. Mathews's father substantiated his alibi, that he had been living with his parents in Seattle for the past 18 months. He identified a picture of Ball as George Blair, whom he had met several months ago while visiting Vancouver, B.C.

Also in March 1914, police in Vancouver, B.C., arrested a suspect named Harry Mathews for a local bank robbery, but he too was the wrong man. On April 14, 1914, Great Northern Railway officials announced that fugitive Harry Mathews was killed in a gun fight with railroad detectives in Lemmon, South Dakota, but two days later, this man was identified as James W. Weininger, an outlaw from Butte, Montana. Great Northern Railway investigators expanded their search for the two murderous bandits to include all of North America, but they were never found.

Sources:
Don Duncan, Washington: The First One Hundred Years (Seattle, The Seattle Times, 1989); “Two Bandits Hold Up Train,” The Bellingham Herald, February 21, 1914, p. 1; “County Combed for Outlaws,” Ibid., February 23, 1914, p. 1; “Sleuths Vanish But Continue Search for Bandits,” Ibid., February 24, 1914, p. 1; “Man Suspected of Aiding the Bandits to Escape,” Ibid., February 25, 1914, p. 1; “Canadians Help Detectives in Search for Bandits,” Ibid., February 27, 1914, p. 1; “No New Clues in Manhunt,” Ibid., February 28, 1914, p. 1; “Detectives on New Line of Inquiry,” Ibid., March 2, 1914, p. 1; “Detectives to Make Final Report,”Ibid., March 20, 1914, p. 1; “Bandit suspect Employed as Waiter,” Ibid., March 27, 1914, p. 1; “Extradition Probably Will Be Fought,” Ibid., March 28, 1914, p. 1; “Marshal Says He Saw Ball on Day of Murder,” Ibid., April 2, 1914, p. 1; “Ball’s Hearing Is Begun in Skagit,” Ibid., April 10, 1914, p. 1; “Alleged Bandit Must Stand Trial,” Ibid., April 11, 1914, p. 8; “Samish Bandit Is Killed in Boxcar?” Ibid., April 14, 1914, p. 1; “Man Shot in Boxcar Not Samish Bandit,” Ibid., April 16, 1914, p. 1; “Witness Against George Ball Is Arrested on Perjury,” Ibid., April 20, 1914; “Bandit Clue Is Uncovered in Tacoma,” Ibid., June 8, 1914, p. 3; “Ball Will Be Set Free, Is Report,” Ibid., June 12, 1914, p. 2; “George Ball Is Liberated in Skagit,” Ibid., June 16, 1914, p. 8; “Perjury Trial Being Held in Skagit County,” Ibid., June 17, 1914, p. 5; “Johnson Is Found Not Guilty by Skagit Jurors,” Ibid., June 18, 1914, p. 6; “Three Passengers Killed in Hold Up of Seattle Train," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, February 21, 1914, p. 1; “Train Robbers Defy Posses in Two Counties,” Ibid., February 22, 1914, p. 1; “Bandits Sought Among Islands,” Ibid., February 23, 1914, p. 2; “Get Clew to Train Robbers,” Ibid., March 26, 1914, p. 1; “Find Man Sought as Train Robber at Steilacoom,” Ibid., March 28, 1914, p. 1; “Innocent, Says Prisoner, But He Won’t Cross Line,” Ibid., March 29, 1914, p. 1; “Accused Bandit Ball Bound Over,” Ibid., April 11, 1914, p. 1; “Prosecutor Puts Ball’s Alibi Up to Attorney General,” Ibid., April 26, 1914, sect 2, p. 2; “G. N. Bandit Suspect To Be Freed Is Report,” Ibid., June 6, 1914, p. 1; “Suicide Believed G. N. Train Bandit,” Ibid., June 7, 1914, sect. 2, p. 5; “Ball’s Alibi So Good Beagle Is for Freeing Him,” Ibid., June 12, 1914, p. 1; “George Ball Is Freed of Murder in G. N. Robbery,” Ibid., June 16, 1914, p. 7.


http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=7623
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:05    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Direct- Line Conversation With The Moscow Soviet February 20, 1918

At 2.15 p.m. the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Lenin, was called up by Comrade Feldman, member of the Executive Committee., who, on behalf of the Bolshevik group, asked Comrade Lenin the following:
(1) What happened after the receipt of the telegram from Berlin;
(2) What measures have been taken by the Council of People's Commissars at present;
(3) Whether or not there was any other reply from Berlin apart from Hofimana's telegram.

To the first question Comrade Lenin replied:
There is no army; the Germans are attacking from Riga along the entire front. They have taken Dvinsk and Rezhitsa and are on their way to Lutsk and Minsk. Those who want to do something-and stop talking-must conclude peace and continue the task of consolidating and extending the revolution at home

To the second question:
Until the offensives are stopped, an order has been issued to put up resistance wherever possible, and destroy everything, down to the last hunk of bread, all along the way.

To the third question:
No, there was none.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/feb/21.htm
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:09    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

HANSARD → 20 February 1918 → Commons Sitting → MILITARY SERVICE.

Mr. SNOWDEN asked the Under-secretary of State for War if he is aware of the condition of Emanuel Ribeiro, a conscientious objector, now in Lord Derby War Hospital, near Warrington, who has been forcibly fed for more than twelve months and that, in the opinion of one of the doctors attending him, his condition is such that if the present treatment be continued it must soon end fatally; and what action he proposes to take in the matter?

Mr. KING asked whether Emanuel Ribeiro, a conscientious objector, is still an inmate of Lord Derby War Hospital, Warrington; whether he has been forcibly fed for over twelve months; whether he is still considered non-genuine in his conscientious objection; and whether, in view of his broken health, he will now be released?

Mr. MACPHERSON I am aware of the condition of Emanuel Ribiero, as a Special Medical Board has recently assembled to render a report, which I have perused. Briefly, the report is that his physical health is good, that he has gained 20 lbs. in weight in the last six months, that he himself says that he is far from being depressed or downcast, and he amuses himself with reading. He declines to tell anybody anything of his family history, but smiles and has a cheery face, and is in no way melancholy. The Board are of opinion that he is absolutely free from any form of mental disorder and in the full enjoyment of his faculties.

Sir JOHN BARLOW asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that Thomas D. Matchett, a schoolmaster, lately employed under the Wilts education authority, residing in Bath, and a conscientious objector, who was given exemption from combatant service by the Bath local and Somerset Appeal Tribunals which he declined to accept, stating his willingness to pursue his professional work as being the work of greatest national importance which he could perform, who was court-martialled at Weymouth and sentenced to 112 days' imprisonment at Wormwood Scrubs, and who suffered in health during his confinement, losing over 15 lbs. in weight, was again court-martialled and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in Dorchester Gaol and, having developed tuberculosis, accompanied by severe hæmorrhage, was sent to Winsley Sanatorium, near Bath, on or about the 12th of November, and after six weeks pronounced an unsuitable case by the medical officer of that institution; that he has since been discharged from the Army and from custody and is now lying dangerously ill at his home in Bath, and is unable to earn anything in support of his wife and two children; and whether he proposes to make him any allowance by way of maintenance of those dependent upon him?

The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Sir George Cave)
This man was released from prison in order to go to a sanatorium in November last. I have no information with regard to his present circumstances, and I am not aware of any public fund from which any allowance could be made to him or his family. Certainly there is no such fund under my control.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1918/feb/20/conscientious-objectors
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:12    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

20 FEBRUARY, 1917: ASK DON’T GET

A hundred years ago today, the Petrograd Conference broke up. Called for the purpose of assessing and improving Russia’s contribution to the Allied war effort, and Allied contributions to the Russian war effort, it had lasted 20 days and achieved very little. All the same, the fact that it took place at all and the ways in which it failed do add up to an interesting glimpse at what an alliance between Britain, France and Russia really meant in 1917, as well as providing a snapshot of Russian imperial government immediately before it collapsed.

In any war you care to consider, at any time in history, coalitions mean conferences, whether called to coordinate the efforts of allies during a war or to share out the spoils at its end. These days, international conferences at any level can take place without participants leaving their screens, and pre-industrial conferences among military allies ended to take place in the tent next to the battlefield. In between, international conferences involved a lot of overseas travel.

The First World War took place just before technology took the sting out of overseas travel. Conferences between widely separated allies remained arduous and potentially dangerous undertakings, usually conducted during the military quiet periods of mid-winter or high summer to reduce the risk of some major strategic change during the slow process of convening the delegates.

This basic logistic problem was one reason why it took the Allies until the end of 1915 to organise a major conference in France (8 December, 1915: Chat Lines), and the main reason why it was difficult to arrange any kind of conference between the Allies and Russia. If getting a few Russian delegates to France represented an achievement, nobody wanted to ship boatloads of Allied delegates to Russia for a conference unless absolutely necessary. By the middle of 1916, from both sides of the alliance, it was beginning to seem absolutely necessary.

From a Russian perspective (as if perspective was a factor in imperial Russian government), the alliance wasn’t providing anything like enough military, supply or financial support. Officials in Petrograd regarded the war on the Eastern Front as vital to the future of the Western Front, and believed that the Allies – and particularly Russia’s prime supplier, Britain – were holding back supplies because they failed to appreciate this fact. Russian diplomats had meanwhile been unable to soften Britain’s hostility to unilateral trade between Russia and the USA, an attitude Petrograd put down to jealousy.

From an Allied point of view, the real problem with supplying the Russians was the Russian regime. Shiploads of supplies were known to be rotting in dockyards that were simply not equipped to deal with the amount of traffic being sent from the West, let alone with the hundred percent increase the Russians were demanding. The western Allies also doubted that military aid was being used properly when it did arrive, and the same applied to the financial credit being extended to Russia. As for unilateral transatlantic trade, the British in fact feared that Russian business methods, considered cavalier and untrustworthy, could destabilise Allied relations with the USA.

Behind all these concerns lay a deep Allied mistrust of the Russian political and bureaucratic systems, and a mounting belief that the only way to sort them out was to go to Russia, find out what was really happening there and arrange support accordingly. This was the main reason for Lord Kitchener’s trip to Russia in July 1916, which followed the failure of a London conference on Russian affairs, but his death en route postponed matters. During the autumn, as Russian demands for loans beyond the scope of current agreements sparked another round of fruitless discussions with diplomats, plans were finalised for a major conference at Petrograd in early 1917.

Led by cabinet ministers and senior generals, British, French and Italian delegations finally reached Petrograd at the end of January, and after a few days of fractious preliminary meetings the conference opened officially on 1 February. It quickly became clear that a full plenary session would be so crowded that any serious progress would be impossible, so the conference was split into committees to deal separately with military, political, financial and supply issues. Even then, to the particular annoyance of British delegates, proceedings were slowed because a lot of senior Russian delegates were new to their jobs, such was the rate of ministerial turnover in the Tsar’s crumbling government, and by squabbling between rival Russian ministries.

The political committee had the easiest task, largely confined to confirming present arrangements and ensuring that all parties were aware of the others’ intentions. The military committee was essentially in the same position, although the western Allies were obliged to repeat their rejection, confirmed at the Rome Conference a few weeks earlier (7 January, 1917: Back Door Man), of Russian demands that Greece be compelled to join the War on the Allied side, using military force if necessary. Discussions about finance centred on Russia’s attempts to stop Britain demanding gold payments for loans made the previous year, and to secure unlimited credit for the duration of the War. They got nowhere, with Lord Milner, the head of the British delegation, eventually ending the debate by insisting on the need for further study.

The most important discussions and heated arguments were reserved for the knotty question of supplying Russia with military aid and trade. The Russians wanted more weapons from the western Allies, especially artillery, machine guns and rifles, but their negotiating technique reflected the regime they spoke for – inclined to fantasy, comfortable with fiction and naturally uncompromising – so they simply demanded huge numbers of everything. The British and French (Italy was asking, not giving) wanted realistic assessments of Russia’s actual needs and of how much Russian docks could actually handle. Supply would then depend on Allied estimates of what would constitute bang for buck on the field of battle. These were not compatible positions, and they hadn’t got much more compatible by the time the conference broke up.

The Petrograd Conference failed to instigate any real changes in policy or process, failed to elicit any signs of reasonable compromise from the Russian administration, and was quickly rendered null and void by revolution in Russia – but it did provide one or two small benefits to the Allied war effort. The Allies had learned to address all their issues with Russia as a coordinated whole, and their willingness to send important delegates such a long way had confirmed (to themselves and to Russians) the seriousness of their commitment to the alliance. This helped smooth relations with the new Provisional Government in Petrograd, and some of the more useful organisational reforms discussed at the Conference did survive to improve the flow of supplies in the months that followed.

Petrograd also gave us a last, damning glimpse of imperial Russian bureaucracy and government at work before the February Revolution (which took place in March by the western calendar) consigned them to history. The British, the French and the new Russian government were all quick to point the finger at the old regime when analysing the failings of the Conference, and I’m no apologist for the last Tsar’s catastrophic performance, but there is another side to that part of the story.

No matter how loudly they blamed Russian inefficiency, corruption and intransigence, the British had come to Petrograd with no intention of shifting their own position on supply and finance, or of admitting their own weakness in those matters. By early 1917, all Allied loan and credit arrangements were dependent on US agreement, and a Wilson administration desperate to find grounds for peace was in no mood to make generous arrangements with belligerent autocracies. Any major increase in supplies to Russia would also depend on US industry, which was already working to full capacity for its preferred Anglo-French clients, and anyway the rapid increase in losses to German submarines meant the British couldn’t spare any shipping to deliver more supplies. Nothing about any of this was going to change in Petrograd, and the British knew it.

So although it wasn’t the first, the last or anything like the most significant example of the practice, the Petrograd Conference was a reminder of how easily and often the presence of a convincing scapegoat can be used to distract history’s attention from the full picture.

http://poppycockww1.com/russia/20-february-1917-ask-dont-get/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:14    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Vladimir Vazov at Furka - 20 February 1917

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Vazov_at_Furka_20_February_1917.jpg
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:16    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

AGIUS WORLD WAR ONE

20th February 1916 - Arthur remembers his sad parting from Dollie – just one week ago; some of his letters have finally arrived home in Hampstead – but not the ones describing his journey back to France by train and boat; the luxury of having a small but adequate bathtub in his bedroom.

Arthur to Dollie

Hotel du Commerce, Sunday 1.20pm

… Your Friday letter came to-day: thanks awfully for it, dear. I’m so glad that at last you have heard from me. The letter about my journey I gave to the R.T.O. at Longpre on Monday morning and he promised to post it for me. I had hoped that you would thus get it on Wednesday. It contained letters I wrote on board at Folkestone, at Boulogne & at Longpre – so I hope it will turn up.

To-day DG is very fine but cold. I spent most of the morning in church from about a quarter past ten until twelve. Lunch at half-past. Evie has just got the letter that we wrote him for his birthday! Thanks us very much. Do you remember last Sunday – alas by now I had already left. I miss you awfully dear, & just long for our reunion – God bless you.

Last night we borrowed the gramophone from HQ & played it during & after dinner. I came to bed at 9 & had a priceless bath in a tub in my room. The tub was a bit small – but the water compensated for it; it was boiling!

How is your Mater, dear, & all at home, things running smoothly? I shall try & get a metal flask this afternoon.\

http://agiusww1.com/2016/02/20/20th-february-1916/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:18    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Zeppelin Raids, Gothas and 'Giants' - Britain's First Blitz - 1914-1918

20th February 1916 - Seaplanes of Seeflieger Abteilung No.1 were in action over English coastal towns again on Sunday 20 February 1916. The wireless station at Caister on the Norfolk coast picked up radio transmissions at 10.30am but before their significance could be established, bombs began falling on Lowestoft. The approaching aircraft were a Friedrichshafen FF 33e and a Hansa-Brandenburg NW. The first aircraft appeared at 10.55am and circled over the southern side of the town for about five minutes, dropping bombs and heading back out to sea. The second raider appeared at 11.10am with one report stating it remained over the town for six minutes while ranother claimed eiight minutes.

The raiders dropped 19 small high-explosive bombs of which one failed to detonate and two fell in the sea. The bombs caused no serious damage according to official reports, but a newspaper mentioned considerable damage to ‘two dwellings and the outbuildings of a restaurant’. One bomb exploded close to the Primitive Methodist Chapel, blowing out the windows while the congregation were inside. A newspaper reported, ‘The congregation was greatly alarmed, but left without disorder or panic, the service being abandoned.’ Three bombs also fell ‘harmlessly’ close to the gasworks. The bomb that failed to detonate crashed through the roof of a workman’s cottage and landed in the bedroom, the occupants having a lucky escape. Some slight military damage occurred at the headquarters of the 5th Provisional Brigade. A bomb struck a greenhouse and broke the telephone line; a staff captain and a clerk received minor glass cuts.

Deze nog maar eens even pluggen. Mooie site! Lees dus verder op http://www.iancastlezeppelin.co.uk/20-feb-1916/4589874370
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:20    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

ROMANOV FAMILY: ON THIS DATE IN THEIR OWN WORDS: MARIA ROMANOV, 20 FEBRUARY, 1916.

From the 1916 diary of Maria Romanov:

20 February. Rode with A. and Shura. Walked-skipped with A. Breakfast 5 with Papa and Mama and 2 Englishmen. In the afternoon built the tower 4 with Papa and the sailors. Went to our infirmary with A. Sat with Sh.[akh]-N.[Nazarov]. Had tea with Papa, Mama and Uncle Pavel. Went to Vsenoshnaya 4 with Papa. Had dinner with the same with Mama on the couch. Papa read, Anya was here.

From the book MARIA and ANASTASIA: The Youngest Romanov Grand Duchesses In Their Own Words: Letters, Diaries, Postcards.

http://www.theromanovfamily.com/maria-romanov-20-february-1916/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:22    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Dublin Western Front Association: Owen Hughes, Private 21261 & Michael Byrne, Private 21933, 8 Royal Irish Fusiliers, died, 20 February, 1916.

Lees er alles over op http://wfadublin.webs.com/20-february-1916-2016
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:25    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

The Diary of Arthur L. Linfoot - January 1914 – December 1918

29 February 1916; Tuesday - On parade as usual. At the pictures at night with Sharpley.

https://www.arthurlinfoot.org.uk/category/1916/february1916/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:35    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

Islington - Online Book of Remembrance

On this day we remember

Thomas Blake
Died 20 February 1916 age not known.
Service: Army

Henry George Cronin
Died 20 February 1918 age not known.
Service: Army

George Robert Diffey
Died 20 February 1919 age 27.
Service: Army

George William Edward Eyles
Died 20 February 1917 age 34.
Service: Army

Lees verder op http://bookofremembrance.islington.gov.uk/BookOfRemembrance/
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:38    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

WW1 Timeline - February 1915

20 February - Two companies of the Dover Volunteer Training Corps are formed. Instruction in musketry and infantry drill were regularly given.

http://www.dovermuseum.co.uk/Exhibitions/WW1Timeline/1915/February.aspx
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BerichtGeplaatst: 20 Feb 2018 10:39    Onderwerp: Reageer met quote

War Diary Extract for 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment on 20 February 1915.

William Sorrell was wounded on that day, and it is possible that due to his actions on that day, he was subsequently promoted to Acting Corporal.

Bekijk alles op https://cis.photoarchive.merton.gov.uk/archive/documents/war-diaries/1110872-war-diary-for-south-staffordshire-regiment-on-20-february-1915-william-sorrell?
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